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Neutrality Agreements and Card Check
Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms
JamesJ. Brudney
ABSTRACT: The rise of neutrality agreements is a major development in
labor-management relations in this country. The union movement's new
approach to organizing displaces elections supervised by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) with negotiated agreements that provide for
employers to remain neutral during an upcoming union campaign and (in
most instances) for employees to decide if they wish to be represented through
signing authorization cards rather than through a secret ballot election.
Professor Brudney demonstrates the substantial role now being played by this
contractually based approach to union organizing. He also explains why so
many employers have agreed to neutrality and card check as a matter of
business judgment. The Article then considers and rejects the principal
doctrinal arguments challenging the facial validity of neutrality and card
check. Finally, the Article questions the continued persuasiveness of the
longstanding theory that employee freedom of choice in the union
representation setting is best realized through Board-supervised elections. The
election paradigm is no longer descriptively accurate in that over 80 % of new
organizing in recent years has occurred outside the ALRB elections process.
The paradigm also is no longer normatively justified: an array of findings
and studies indicate that the NLRB elections regime regularly tolerates,
encourages, and effectively promotes coercive conditions that preclude the
attainment of employee free choice. The Article concludes by suggesting that the
election paradigm should be substantially modified if not entirely supplanted
in light of the evidentiary record over the past 30 years and the emergence of a
credible alternative model for promoting employee free choice.
* Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law. I am grateful to Victor Brudney, Cindy Estlund, Fred Feinstein, Matt Finkin,
Ted St. Antoine, and Paul Weiler for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. I
thank Patrick Brodhead, Rebecca Fitzthum, Carla McNeill, Ken Rubin, and Sara Sampson for
excellent research assistance, and Amy Beaudreault for her careful preparation of the
manuscript. All remaining errors are mine. The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law,
and its Center for Law, Policy, and Social Science, each contributed generous financial
assistance for this project.
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INTRODUCTION
[I]t is important... [to] not[e] ... what scientists never do when
confronted by even severe and prolonged anomalies. Though they
may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they do
not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis ....
[O]nce it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is
declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its
place.'
At the heart of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act") 2 is §
7, guaranteeing workers the right to band together for the purpose of
bargaining collectively "through representatives of their own choosing."'
This employee choice, including the right to refrain from selecting a union,
has long been analogized to decision-making by voters in the political
context.4 The resonance of the comparison between industrial democracy
and political democracy has helped make elections supervised by the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") the dominant
explanatory structure, or paradigm, for the free exercise of employee choice
under the NLRA.
The past decade has witnessed a growing challenge by organized labor
to the validity of the election paradigm as a preferred approach in
ascertaining which "representatives of their own choosing" employees want.5
A central component of unions' challenge is their success in negotiating
agreements that provide for employers to remain neutral during an
upcoming union organizing campaign. These neutrality agreements
generally include language specifying that the employer will not exercise its
right to demand a Board-supervised election, but will instead recognize the
union as exclusive representative, and participate in collective bargaining, if
a majority of its employees sign valid authorization cards. 6
1. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77 (2d ed. 1970).
2. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U-S.C. §§ 151-169
(2000)). I use "NLRA" to refer to the 1935 statute as amended in 1947, 1959, and at other later
times.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
4. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal
Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 503-07 (1993) (discussing reliance on analogy in legislative
history to 1935 Wagner Act).
5. See generally Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO Asks Affiliates to Support Organizing at Comcast,
Verizon Wireless, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-4 (Mar. 12, 2004); Susan Sala, Labor, Employment
Laws Are Interdependent, AFL-CIO President Sweeney Tells ABA Group, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1
(July 12, 2000).
6. See infra Part I (describing neutrality agreements as utilized in American workplace
since mid-1990s); infra text accompanying notes 18-23 (summarizing employers' traditional
right to opt for either Board election or voluntary recognition when presented with a card
majority).
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Neutrality agreements combined with card check recognition provide a
distinct mechanism enabling employees to select representatives for
purposes of collective bargaining. This approach to union organizing has
partially displaced Board-supervised elections, and has become the principal
7
strategy pursued by many labor organizations. Its non-electoral focus has
attracted increased attention from labor law scholars,8 generated resistance
from segments of the business community,9 and sparked controversy in
Congress."' Legislation has been proposed to ban the new organizing
technique, and supporters of that legislative effort invoke the election
paradigm as the sole method appropriate for implementing employees'
freedom to choose their representatives."
This Article examines the rise of neutrality agreements and card check
in the context of the election paradigm. The basic fault line exposed by
debate over these agreements involves whether to modify or even abandon
reliance on Board-supervised elections as the favored method of
determining if employees wish to be represented by a union. Proponents
within organized labor view neutrality agreements plus card check
recognition as fundamentally preferable to the election option." Although
there may be risks of misuse in particular instances, supporters contend that
7. See infra Part I (discussing shift in organizing focus away from NLRB representation
elections).
8. Compare Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 369 (2001)
(supportive of new approach), and William J. Guzick, Employer Neutrality Agreements: Union
Organizing Under a Nonadversarial Model of Labor Relations, 6 INDUs. REL. L.J. 421 (1984) (same),
with Samuel Estreicher, Essay: Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities
for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 834-38 (1996) (questioning certain aspects of
new approach), and Compulsory Union Dues and Corporate Campaigns: Hearings on H.R. 4636 Before
the Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the House Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 107th Cong. 6-7
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 House Hearings] (statement ofJarol B. Manheim, Professor, George
Washington University) (critical of new approach).
9. See Labor Organizing Campaigns: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Enployer-Employee Relations
of the House Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter 2004 House
Hearing] (statement of Charles I. Cohen, Senior Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, on
behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (critical of new approach); Daniel V. Yager &Joseph
J. LoBue, Corporate Campaigns and Card Checks: Creating the Company Unions of the Twenty-First
Century, EMP. REL. L.J., Spring 1999, at 21 (same). See generally Andrew M. Kramer et al.,
Neutrality Agreements: The New Frontier in Labor Relations-Fair Play or Foul?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 39
(1981) (expressing criticism at earlier stages).
10. Compare H.R. 4636, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (banning recognition through neutrality
agreements and card check), and H.R. 4343, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004) (same), with S. 1925, 108th
Cong. § 2 (2003) (authorizing Board certification of unions chosen by majority of unit
employees based on card check), and H.R 3619, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (same).
11. See infra Part II (discussing employer community opposition in doctrinal terms).
12. See generally Eric Lekus, Card Check, Neutrality Accords Best Way For Unions to Organize,
UNITE's Raynor Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-I (June 4, 2004); Unions Launch Campaign
Asking Quebecor to Sign Agreement on Core Labor Standards, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-6 (Dec. 8,
2003).
[20051
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the new approach safeguards employee freedom of choice better than
elections do, while promoting a structure for more civil labor-management
discourse and encouraging stable labor relations based on respect for
voluntary arrangements negotiated between unions and employers."1
Opponents within the business community regard neutrality plus card
check as inherently threatening to employee free choice. They maintain that
privately negotiated agreements and reliance on authorization card
signatures allow unions to exert undue pressure on individual employees,
thereby undermining the importance of secrecy, confidentiality, and a non-
coercive environment in determining fairly the preferences of employees.
14
At the same time, these opponents fail to acknowledge how the fundamental
asymmetry of power between employers and unions in the pre-recognition
context-an asymmetry that is deeply rooted in the current election-based
structure-has long presented its own inherent threats to uncoerced choice
by individual employees. The aspirational model of open and fair union
representation elections cannot be squared with the reality of a regulatory
regime that allows, if not encourages, employers to exert inordinate pressure
on employee choice in the electoral process.15 Accordingly, the debate over
the legal and public policy implications of neutrality agreements that
provide for card check recognition offers a chance to re-examine basic
approaches to self-determination under the NLRA.
Part I of the Article describes the proliferation of neutrality agreements,
especially agreements that include card check provisions. Relying on recent
empirical studies, Part I also explains why unions favor these arrangements
and why many employers accept them. Part II considers the legal critique of
these negotiated arrangements, focusing on § 8(a)(2) of the Act16 and the
idea of interference with employee free choice. Part 11 analyzes the business
community's principal legal arguments related to employees' freedom to
choose and concludes that they are deficient-both neutrality agreements
generally and card check provisions in particular are plainly permissible
under the NLRA.
Part III addresses the deeper concern about displacing the election
paradigm, borrowing from Thomas Kuhn's framework for explaining
change in the natural sciences to analyze the possibilities for such an
underlying shift. The Supreme Court in 1969 and 1974 endorsed as
reasonable the Board's position that elections are the descriptively pre-
eminent and normatively optimal method for determining employee
choice. 17 Judicial and agency cases amplifying this position have assumed for
13. See infra Parts II and III (presenting legal and policy arguments favoring neutrality and
card check).
14. See infta Parts 11 and Ill (presenting arguments opposed to neutrality and card check).
15. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing deterioration of the election paradigm).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (2000).
17. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596, 607 (1969); Linden Lumber Div. v.
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decades that Board-supervised elections are fair and even-handed. Part III
maintains, however, that it is no longer appropriate to overlook the
anomalies associated with the prevailing explanatory model.
As a factual matter, Board elections have ceased to be the dominant
mechanism for determining whether employees want union representation.
The development of substantial alternative approaches signals a recognition
that assumptions about the basic fairness of Board elections have turned out
not to be realistic. Participants on both sides understand that Board-
supervised election campaigns regularly feature employers' exercise of their
lawful yet disproportionate authority to help shape election results, as well as
employers' use of their power to affect outcomes unlawfully but with relative
impunity. These patterns of conduct have helped generate alternative
contractually based approaches to organizing that appear to be used at least
as widely as Board elections to determine whether employees wish to join
unions. Part III concludes by suggesting ways in which the election paradigm
might be restructured so as to make it more sensitive to the imbalance of
power that exists between employers and employees. In the alternative, Part
III allows for the possibility of abandoning altogether the notion of a single
reigning paradigm.
I. THE RISE OF NEUTRALITY AND CARD CHECK AGREEMENTS
A. BYPASSING NLRB ELECTIoNs SINCE 7HE MID-1 990s
A labor organizing campaign typically begins when a union is contacted
by employees who for any number of reasons feel unfairly treated in their
work environment.' In the course of its campaign, the union distributes
authorization cards, providing supportive employees with the chance to
designate the union as their bargaining representative. ° If the union has
received card support from a majority of employees at the establishment, it
ordinarily will request that the employer recognize the union and enter into
a collective bargaining relationship.20 The employer may lawfully accede to
this request (provided there is in fact uncoerced maiority support for the
union). 21 Employers, however, usually decline the union's request and
exercise their right to demand a representation election, in which they will
urge their employees to vote against unionization; the election is thus a
NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304 (1974). For a discussion of these cases, see infta Part III.
18. SeeJULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 20 (2d ed.
1999).
19. See id. at 21. Authorization cards state that the signer has designated the particular
union as his or her representative for purposes of collective bargaining. See Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. at 595-610 (discussing authorization card use under the Act).
20. See GETMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 21.
21. See id.
[20051
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contest challenging the union's assertion that it enjoys majority support.
After an employer refuses a request for recognition, the union files a
petition with the NLRB, in order to schedule the election in which it can
demonstrate its majority status.
Starting in the late 1970s, individual employers and unions began
negotiating agreements that modified this traditional approach by providing
for employers to remain neutral in future organizing campaigns. A 1976
letter agreement between General Motors and the United Auto Workers
specified that "General Motors management will neither discourage nor
encourage the Union's efforts in organizing production and maintenance
employees traditionally represented by the Union elsewhere in General
Motors, but will observe a posture of neutrality in these matters."24 Other
early neutrality agreement language conditioned an employer's neutral
stance on "responsible" union behavior, pledging that management would
remain neutral in future organizing campaigns "providing the Union
conducts itself in a manner which neither demeans the Corporation as anS .- ,,25
Organization nor its representatives as individuals.
By the late 1990s, as unions bargained for neutrality protection with
greater frequency, these agreements had become a central component of
the labor movement's organizing strategy. 6 In an important empirical study,
Professors Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky collected and analyzed 132
neutrality agreements negotiated by twenty-three different national unions;
approximately 80% of the agreements they examined were bargained
during the 1990s. 2 7 One-half of the neutrality agreements covered employees
in the service sector, with the majority of these negotiated in the hospitality,
28gaming, and telecommunication areas. Within the manufacturing sector,
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Auto Workers Approve General Motors Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-13 (Dec. 8,
1976).
25. Kramer et al., supra note 9, at 47 (quoting the Neutrality Agreement of June 6, 1979
between Philip Morris and Local 16 T of the Bakery, Confectionery, & Tobacco Workers
union).
26. See, e.g., Neutrality Agreement Between Avondale Industries and Metal Trades Dept. of the AFL-
CIO, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-21 (Nov. 3, 1999). See generally Hartley, supra note 8, at 374-78.
27. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill K-iesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check
Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 45 (2001). Eaton and Kriesky used surveys and
extensive literature research to obtain information during 1997 and 1998 on organizing
agreements from thirty-six national unions with 10,000 members or more; twenty-three of these
unions had negotiated at least one neutrality agreement. Id.
28. See id. at 45-46. The Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Union ("HERE") had the
largest single number of agreements (27.5% of the authors' sample). Id. at 46. Eaton and
Kriesky reported that their study underrepresented HERE's activities and also omitted sufficient
service sector examples from the United Food and Commercial Workers ("UFCW') and the
International Longshore and Warehouse unions. Id.
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most agreements were in the auto and steel industries.29
Not surprisingly, Professors Eaton and Kriesky found considerable
variation in the substantive aspects of these agreements. ° Certain core
provisions, however, were present in the vast majority of settings. Almost all
agreements included an explicit employer commitment to neutrality (93%),
and some two-thirds of the agreements (65%) included both a statement of
neutrality and a provision to recognize union majority status through card
check procedures.3 ' Notably, card check provisions (with and even without
neutrality statements) were associated with a substantial reduction in the
numbers of employers running anti-union campaigns, and card check
arrangements also reduced the intensity of such campaigns.3 2 The
diminished levels of employer opposition presumably relate to unions'
ability to recruit majority support in a shorter time span through
authorization cards than under election arrangements and also to unions'
ability to reach large numbers of workers before employers can begin to
generate pressure against the organizing effort.
The Eaton and Kriesky study reported certain other common features
that were typically included in these bargained-for organizing agreements.
Some two-thirds of the agreements called for union access to the employer's
physical property, thereby contracting around the access restrictions
established in 1992 by the Supreme Court.3 Nearly four-fifths of the
agreements imposed certain limits on the union's behavior-most often the
union agreed not to attack management during its campaign, but
agreements also provided for organizing to occur during a specified period
of time or for unions to notify management in advance of their intention to
29. See id. at 45. A search of the Daily Labor Report for articles containing the phrases
"neutrality agreement" or "card check" from 1997 through August 2004 yielded nearly 300
articles. Among a sample of major international unions, HERE appeared twenty-six times,
Communication Workers of America ("CMWA") twenty-five times, United Automobile Workers
("UAW') twenty-one times, Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") fifteen times, and
United Steelworkers of America ("USWA") eleven times (search results on file with author).
30. After studying the agreements and published reports about them, and conducting
structured telephone interviews of union representatives familiar with the agreements, Eaton
and Kriesky collected content-specific data for 118 of the 132 agreements. Eaton & Kriesky,
supra note 27, at 46.
31. See id, at 46-47. Of the 35% of agreements that did not provide both a statement of
employer neutrality and card check recognition procedures, 27% included neutrality without
referring to card check and 8% included card check without providing explicitly for employer
neutrality. Id. at 47.
32. See id. at 49-50. The union alleged management violations of neutrality-only
agreements in 90% of all nentrality-only cases, but management violations were alleged in only
43% of all cases involving card check recognition procedure,. Id. Card check agreements were
accompanied by neutrality provisions almost nine-tenths of the time. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
33. See id. at 47-48; see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding that
under NLRA, union organizers have right of access to employees in the workplace only at
physically isolated worksites such as logging camps or tourist hotels).
[20051
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initiate a particular organizing campaign.34 Finally, more than 90% of the
agreements called for some form of dispute resolution, most often
arbitration, to address differences about unit determination or allegations of
15
non-neutral conduct by one of the parties.
Organized labor's increased reliance on neutrality agreements plus card
check does not mean that unions have forsaken the NLRB elections process.
While the annual number of representation elections declined by roughly
50% during the early 1980s, election usage remained relatively constant at
slightly under 3500 per year between 1983 and 1998. Since 1998, however,
the number of Board elections has declined again by close to 30%.
Strikingly, as union organizing activity has increased, the annual number of
Board representation elections has reached its lowest level since the 1940s.
38
To be sure, unions in recent times have enjoyed higher win rates when
seeking to organize through elections. The union win rate in NLRB
representation elections has climbed steadily from 47.7% in 1996 to 57.8%
in 2003, its highest level since the late 1960s.39 This period of success
corresponds to the 1995 arrival of.JohnJ. Sweeney as the new president of
the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
("AFL-CIO"). Sweeney prevailed in a contested campaign after promising to
focus more aggressively on organizing efforts, 40 and both the AFL-CIO and
its affiliates have committed substantial additional resources to organizing
41since 1995. Comments from prominent management attorneys suggest that
34. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 47-48.
35- See id.
36. See DUNLOP COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, FACT FINDING
REPORT 81 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT] (describing data through 1990);
Henry S. Farber, Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Unit Size Matter?, 54 INnIUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 329, 330-31 (2001) (describing data through 1995); Trends: Number of Elections,
Union Win Rate Declined in 1999from Year Before, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1, C-2 (May 23,
2000) [hereinafter Number of Elections] (reviewing 1995-1998 data, and reporting 3,229 Board
representation elections in 1998).
37. See Trends: Number of Elections Decreased in 2003; Union Win Rate Increases for Seventh Year,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-I (June 8, 2004) [hereinafter Trends] (reviewing 1999-2003 data,
and reporting steady decline in number of elections--2,333 Board representation elections in
2003).
38. See 11 NLRB ANN. REP. 4-5 (1946) (reviewing number of elections and cross-checks
(comparing union authorization cards with employers' payrolls) from 1936-1946).
39. See RobertJ. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the
Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. C1IIC. L. REV. 953, 959 (1991) (summarizing NLRB
annual reports data on union win rates from 1950 to 1988); Tyends, supra note 37, at C-1
(discussing union win rate in recent years).
40. See generally Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO Leaders Warn Corporations That They Are Ready for
a Fight, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-5 (Oct. 27, 1995); Elizabeth Walpole-Hofrneister et al.,
Special Report: Unions Boost Fund, Develop Strategies for Organizing More Workers, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at C-I (Aug. 18, 1999).
41. See, e.g., Michelle Amber, Special Report: AFL-CIO Convenes Organizing Sunmiit to Find New
Ways to Expand Membership, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1, (>2 (Jan. 14, 2003) (describing
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union organizers have become more sophisticated and effective in their use
of traditional techniques during election campaigns, including direct worker
contact and strategic targeting of employers within a given industry.42
Unions also are using some less traditional techniques in these campaigns,
such as forging partnerships with religious organizations and community
groups, 43 and researching target companies as part of corporate campaigns
that appeal to stockholders, board members, and institutional lenders.44
At the same time, however, the proliferation of neutrality agreements
that include card check provisions is part of a larger commitment on the
part of unions to modify the NLRB election-based approach to organizing.
The AFL-CIO has reported organizing nearly three million workers in the
six years from 1998 to 2003; less than one-fifth of these newly organized employees
were added through the formerly pre-eminent Board elections process.4' Some of the
substantial commitment of funds to organizing made by various individual unions); Walpole-
Hofmeister et al., supra note 40, at C-I, C-3 (describing AFL-CIO's goal of having its affiliated
international unions expend 30% of their budgets on organizing, and reporting that some
affiliates already are exceeding that goal). See generally AFL-CIO President Says Labor Will Make
Right to Organize Civil Rights Issue of 1990s, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-5 (July 29, 1997).
42. See, e.g., Walpole-Hofmeister et al., supra note 40, at C-1 (statement by Betty Southard
Murphy); id. at C-6 (statement by Donald L. Dotson); Michelle Amber, Special Report: SEIU Sees
Record Growth; 64,000 New Members Organized in 1998, Lab. Rel. Week (BNA), at 1419, 1421 (Dec.
23, 1999) (statement by G. Roger King); LITTLER MENDELSON, STRATEGIC INITIATIVES FOR THE
CHANGING WORKFORCE 28 (2004-2005) (statement by prominent management-side law firm),
available at http://www.littler.com/publications/O4Strategic%201nitiatives%20Wrhite%20Paper
.pdf (on File with the Iowa Law Review). See generally Rachel Sherman & Kim Voss, "Organize or
Die": Labor's New Tactics and Immigrant Workers, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR
UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 81, 84-85 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2001) (discussing
intensified approaches to "rank and file" organizing),
43. See, e.g., Amber, supra note 42 (describing SEIU alliance with a Catholic cardinal to
intervene in organizing campaign at Catholic hospital in California);Jon Newberry, Two Unions
to Charge Discrimination at Cintas, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at B8 (reporting on joint
press conference involving UNITE, Teamsters, and several national civil rights groups, held in
midst of unions' organizing campaigns and aimed at highlighting employer's discriminatory
practices against women and minorities). See generally Tony LaRussa, Churches Reach Out to
Workers, PITTS. TRIB.-REv., Sept. 1, 2003, at B1 (discussing growing bonds between religious
community and labor movement).
44. See generally Sherman & Voss, supra note 42, at 85; Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto,
Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505, 506-08 (1990);
Margaret Levi, Organizing Power: The Prospects for an Amiemcan Labor Movement, I PERSP. ON POL.
45, 54 (2003).
45. For the six year period ending in 2003, the AFL-CIO reports that its affiliates
organized 500,000 employees in 1998; 600,000 in 1999; 400,000 in 2000; 400,000 in 2001;
523,000 in 2002; and 400,000 in 2003. See E-mail from Kevin Byrne, Organizing Department,
AFL-CIO, to James Brudney (Oct. 20, 2003) (on file with author); E-mail from Andy Levin,
Organizing Department, AFL-CIO, to James Brudney (Sept. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
During this same period, Board election victories by all unions (AFL-CIO affiliates and also
small, independent unions) covered a total of 550,000 employees. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at
E-1 (Dec. 29, 2003) (reporting that union wins in all Board representation elections in 1998
covered 107,077 employees); NLRB REPRESENTATION AND DECERTIFICATION ELECTION
STATISTICS: YEAR-END 2003 REPORT tbl.1 (BNA Plus 2004) [hereinafter NLRB REPRESENTATION
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recent organizing success involves public sector employees, and some is
attributable to other contractually based approaches, such as accretions of
previously unrepresented or newly acquired facilities that build on existing
bargaining units, 4 6 or negotiated elections supervised by a third party
distinct from the NLRB.47 Still, neutrality combined with card check has
become a major weapon in the arsenal of organized labor. The Service
Employees, Needle Trades Workers, Hotel and Restaurant Workers, and
Autoworkers report that a plurality or majority of newly organized members
AND DECERTIFICATION STATISTICS] (showing that union wins in all Board representation
elections covered 106,815 employees in 1999; 99,571 in 2000; 77,518 in 2001; 82,719 in 2002
and 74,309 in 2003). Union wins in elections involving AFL-CIO unions (including tile
Teamsters for this purpose) covered roughly 12,000 fewer employees each year; from 1998 to
2003, some 475,000 employees were organized in NLRB elections won by AFL-CIO affiliated
unions. See id.; see also Kate Bronfenbrenner & Robert Hickey, The State of Organizing in
California: Challenges and Possibilities, in THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABoR 2003, at 39, 52 tbl.2.5,
68 thl.2.9 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2003) (reporting that in six years from 1997-2002, unions in
California organized 61,714 new employees through NLRB elections and 209,372 through non-
NLRB approaches).
The figures on newly organized workers include public sector employees who are
recruited wholly outside the NLRA domain. Further, the increases in new members do not take
account of offsetting decreases in union density, resulting from retirements or economy-related
job losses for unionized workers, decertification elections, overall growth of the workforce, and
other factors. Since 1998, despite a substantial increase in union organizing, the number of
workers represented by unions has declined slightly (from 17.9 million to 17.4 million) and the
percentage of the workforce represented by unions has fallen as well (from 15.4% to 14.3%).
See HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS 414 tbl.10-2 (Eva E. Jacobs ed., 7th ed. 2004)
(reporting union density figures for 1998 to 2002); News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union Members in 2003 tbl.1 (Jan. 21, 2004) [hereinafter News Release]
(reporting union density figures for 2003), http://www.bls.gov/iiews.ielease/aiclives/
union2_01212004.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
46. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 219 NL.R.B. 388, 389 (1975); Retail Clerks Union, Local 870, 192
N.L.R.B. 240, 241-42 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Agreement on Election Procedures Between Service Employees International
Union ("SEIU") and Catholic Iealthcare West 5 (Apr. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Agreement on
Election Procedures] (specifying standards of conduct and privately supervised elections for up
to eight separate units of employees at acute care hospitals) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
Often, these voluntary agreements allow the employer to campaign while limiting campaign
content (no anti-union communication; only positive, pro-employer messages) or methods (no
captive audience speeches or one-on-one meetings). See Brent Garren, The High Road to
Section 7 Rights: The Law of Voluntary Recognition Agreements 3 (2003) (unpublished paper
delivered at 2003 American Bar Association annual meeting, on file with the Iowa Law Review).
A related contractually based approach used by SEIU involves "hybrid" election agreements,
where the NLRB supervises the representation election but the union and management agree
to rules of conduct during the pre-election period that (i) are more rigorous than what is
required under the NLRA, and (ii) are enforceable by an arbitrator who has the power to order
a new election in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., SEIU v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d
977, 979-81 (9th Cir. 2003); N.Y. Health & Human Serv. Union, 1199/SEIU v. NYU Hosps. Ctr.,
343 F.3d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2003). Unions also may add new members through mergers or
affiliations that absorb the membership of previously separate unions. See generally BMI4F
Members Approve Merger with Teamsters; Join IBT Rail Group, Daily Lab. Rep- (BNA), at A-10 (Oct.
28, 2004).
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have come in through contractual arrangements rather than traditional
Board supervised election campaigns. 4" For these and other unions,
neutrality plus card check accounts for more new recruits than NLRB
election victories.
The labor movement's growing interest in organizing outside the
framework of representation elections has special relevance with respect to
entities that employ larger numbers of workers. It has long been true that
unions' election win rates fall as the size of the contested unit rises, and as a
result, unions' overall win rate before the NLRB can be somewhat
deceptive.4 9 From 1999-2003, unions won nearly 60% of the more than 9000
representation elections that involved units of fewer than fifty employees,
but prevailed in only 42% of the 2200 elections involving 100-499 employees
and in a mere 37% of some 260 elections in which units of more than 500
workers were at stake.50 Many successes in neutrality plus card check
arrangements have involved larger units, often with more than 500
employees, and some unions may be targeting these larger units for their
new approach.5'
48. See, e.g., Amber, supra note 42, at 1419-21 (reporting that of 64,000 workers in newly
SEIU-organized bargaining units, less than 15,000 came through Board elections); Telephone
Interview with Judith A. Scott, General Counsel, SEIU (Sept. 21, 2004) (reporting that from
1998 to 2002, SEIU organized some 550,000 employees in new bargaining units; 82,000 came
through contested government-supervised elections, and more than 100,000 came as a result of
negotiated agreements that include codes of conduct plus either card check or privately
supervised elections) (notes on file with author); Card Check, Neutrality Accords Best Way for
Unions to Organize, UNITE's Raynor Says, Lab. Rel. Week (BNA), at 811 Jrine 10, 2004)
(reporting that 85% of new employees organized by UNITE and HERE in the last year were
organized through card check); Garren, supra note 47, at I (reporting that Union of
Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Workers ("UNITE") has brought in most of its members
through voluntary recognition agreements); Telephone Interview with Daniel W. Sherrick,
General Counsel, UAW (Sept. 15, 2004) (reporting that majority of new employees organized
by UAW in the private sector in 2002 and 2003 have come through neutrality and card check)
(notes on file with author).
49. See Farber, supra note 36, at 333-34 (reporting differential win rates by size of unit
from 1950-1998; since 1960, the win rate for units of fewer than ten employees has averaged
about 60% but the win rate for units of more than 100 employees has averaged below 40%);
Gordon R. Pavy, Winning NLRB Elections and Establishing Collective Bargaining Relationships, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 110, 117 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds.,
1994) [hereinafter RESTORING THE PROMISE] (reporting same sharp differential in union win
rates between small and large units during 1970s and 1980s).
50. See NLRB REPRESENTATION AND DECERTIFICATION STATISTICS, supra note 45, tbl.8. The
number of elections held for different size units also reflects unions' preference for targeting
smaller units and their reluctance to take on election campaigns in larger enterprises. See
Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, supra note 45, at 53-54 (describing the pattern in California and
nationally).
51. For recent reported examples where neutrality plus card check has led to success in
organizing units of more than 500 workers, see Casino Workers Gain Representation By Three Unions
at Caesars in Indiana, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-10 (June 8, 2004) (noting that Teamsters,
Operating Engineers, and HERE organized units of over 800 employees through neutrality and
card check), HERE to Begin Bargaining May 4 with First Unionized Hotel in Houston, Daily Lab. Rep.
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The Eaton and Kriesky findings suggest a link between what provisions
are included in a neutrality agreement and the ultimate success of union
organizing efforts. Organizing campaigns that featured an employer
neutrality statement without providing for card check resulted inS 52
recognition for the union 46% of the time." By contrast, organizing
campaigns in which the parties agreed to both employer neutrality and card
check ended with union recognition 78% of the time.
5
There are notable recent instances where organizing under a neutrality
and card check arrangement has produced no union gains. 54 Still, the 78%
success rate reported by Eaton and Kriesky is well above the union win rate
in Board elections since 1996 and is almost twice the level of union success
in elections involving mid-size and larger units of 100 or more employees. 5
Moreover, and importantly, the rate of achieving a first contract following
recognition approached 100% in the nearly 200 successful organizing
campaigns monitored by Eaton and Kriesky. 5 That degree of achievement
far exceeds the roughly 60% success rate associated with first contracts
following NLRB election victories by unions."
(BNA), at A-6 (Apr. 21, 2004) (noting that HERE organized unit of over 500 employees
through neutrality and card check); Manufacturing Workers at Thomas Built Buses Choose UAW
Representation through Card Check, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-2 (Mar. 23, 2004) (noting that
UAW organized over 1,100 employees at North Carolina facility through neutrality and card
check); Michelle Amber, Alcoa Recognizes USW as Bargaining Agent at Cressona, Pa. Plant Following
Card Check, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-7 (Oct. 10, 2003) (noting that USWA organized unit of
over 700 workers through neutrality and card check); Catherine Hollingsworth, Card Check at
Kentucky Dana Corp. Plant Results in Auto Workers Representation Win, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-
10 (Aug. 20, 2003) (noting that UAW organized unit of 1,000 employees through neutrality and
card check).
52. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 51-52.
53. See id. at 52.
54. See, e-g-, Brief of Amicius Curiae Kaiser Foundation Health Plan at 2, Dana Corp., No.
8-RD-1976 (NLRB June 7, 2004) (order granting review) (reporting that of twenty-three
neutrality-and-card-check agreements negotiated between Kaiser and various unions in nine
states from 1996 to 2004, the union was not able to secure a card majority in five instances
(21.7%), and the employees in those five facilities remain unrepresented),
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/DanaMetaldyne/Kaiser.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law
Review); Susan R. Hobbs, Verizon Neutrality Pact with CWA, IBEW Expires After Four Years; No Units
Organized, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-12 (Aug. 24, 2004) (reporting no new organizing at
Verizon Wireless; union spokesperson asserts management thwarted several active organizing
drives over four years and was not serious about abiding by the neutrality agreement); see also
NLRB Certifies CWA to Represent Oakland Kaiser Permanente Call Center Employees, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at A-7 (July 14, 2004) (reporting that unit of 180 employees chose CIAA in a Board
election rather than selecting unions that were part of neutrality agreement with Kaiser
Permanente),
55. See supra text accompanying note 50 (discussing union success rates in Board elections
for these larger units).
56. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 52.
57. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 73 (reporting that the success rate for
obtaining first contracts between 1986 and 1993 was 56%); Pavy, supra note 49, at 113-15
(reporting that union election wins in 1970 resulted in first contracts 78% of the time, but the
HeinOnline  -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 831 2004-2005
90 IOWA LAWREVIEW
B. WHY UNIONS NlC-OT''IA 7" FOR NEUTRALITY VT CARI) CHECK
Given their comparative track records, it is not hard to understand why
unions would prefer to organize through negotiated neutrality and card
check arrangements rather than pursuing NLRB-supervised elections. The
explanation for the success currently enjoyed tinder neutrality and card
check relates in large part to the effects frequently associated with employer
tactics in opposition to unions during election campaigns. Neutrality
arrangements allow unions to avoid these effects-in particular to sidestep
the intimidating consequences of employers' anti-union speech or conduct
and to minimize the eviscerating impact of lengthy delays under the Board's
legal regime.
With respect to intimidation, numerous studies have demonstrated the
adverse impact of employer speech and conduct opposing unionization. The
greater the amount of employer communication during a campaign, the less
likely a union is to prevail in the election.i s While one could posit that this
adverse impact stems primarily from the countervailing educative aspects of
employer speech, research in the past two decades strongly suggests that it is
the aggressive and hierarchical nature of employer communication that
generates increased management success.
When an employer delivers a series of forceful messages that
unionization is looked upon with extreme disfavor, the impact upon
employees is likely to reflect their perceptions about the speaker's basic
power over their work lives rather than the persuasive content of the words
themselves. Captive audience speeches, oblique or direct threats to act
against union supporters, and intense personal campaigning by supervisors
are among the lawful or borderline lawful techniques that have proven
especially effective in diminishing union support or defeating unionization
over the years.59 Employers' unlawfully discriminatory conduct during
success rate was only 61% following election wins in 1982 and 65% following union victories in
1987); Rising Health Costs, Competition Seen Influencing 1999 Bargaining, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at
C-1 (Dec. 31, 1998) (quoting union consultant's estimate that "a first contract is never reached
in at least one third of representation elections where employees vote for representation"); Paul
Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98
HARV. L. REV. 351, 354-55 (1984) (reporting that certified unions obtain first contract in only
60% of cases).
58, See RiCtHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 234-36 (1984)
(summarizing results from six studies). For a well-known study challenging this conclusion, see
generally JULUS G. GETMAN, STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, & JEANNE B. HERMAN, UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976). For references to critiques of the
Getman study, alleging flawed methodology and drawing of conclusions not warranted by the
data, as well as references to the study authors' response to their critics, see MICHAEL C.
HARPER, SAMUEL ESTREICHER, & JOAN FLYNN, LABOR LAW 345-47 (5th ed. 2003). Apart fiiom
controversy over the Getman study that examined campaigns in the early 1970s, the more
recent studies referred to infra notes 59 and 60 indicate a strong connection between
employers' campaign activity (lawful and unlawful) and declining prospects for union success.
59. See, e.g., Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-
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campaigns-particularly the firing of active or prominent union
supporters-also has substantially curtailed unions' success rate in
elections.60 By reducing or eliminating such tactics, neutrality agreements
substantially improve unions' chances of securing majority support.
With regard to delay, there is again considerable evidence that unions
fare less well as the period of time increases between the filing of an election
petition and the actual election. 61 The impact of delay seems linked in part
to employer use of intimidating speech or conduct during the extended
campaign period.62 In addition, some studies have found that employer
Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE, supra note 49,
at 75, 80-82 (reporting adverse impact from captive audience meetings and from increasing
number of company letters transmitted to employees); William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company
Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law & Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560
(1983) (reporting adverse impact of employer threats, captive audience speeches, and certain
written communications); Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face
of Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 351, 361, 364 (1990) (reporting adverse
impact of supervisors' speaking out against union); Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management
Resistance: Understanding the Decline of Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 526-30
(2001) (reporting adverse impact of captive audience speeches and threats against employees);
see also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 58, at 234-37 (summarizing findings from eleven
studies).
60. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCERNS REGARDING IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE
CHARGES AGAINST EMPLOYERS FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (1982) (reporting diminished
success for unions in campaigns during which employer discrimination occurred); Dickens,
supra note 59, at 568-69 (reporting significant reduction in union support when employer takes
action against pro-union employees); Kleiner, supra note 59, at 528-30 (same); see also FREEMAN
& MEDOFF, supra note 58, at 234-36 (summarizing findings from six studies); Bronfenbrenner,
supra note 59, at 81 (describing how studies actually underestimate negative impact from firings
because they do not include the many campaigns that collapse before an election once the
employer has discharged key union supporters).
61. See, e.g., Bronfenbrenner, supra note 59, at 78-79 (reporting that for 261 union
elections occurring in 1986 and 1987, win Fate declines from 50% if election is held within sixty
days of petition to 31% if election is held 61-180 days after petition); Myron Roomkin &
Richard N. Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of Representation Elections: Some Empirical
Evidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 75, 88--89 (reporting that for over 45,000 union elections studied,
win rate decreases steadily from 50% (if election occurs less than one month after petition is
filed) to 30% (if election occurs four to seven months after petition is filed)); Richard Prosten,
The Longest Season: Union Organizing in the Last Decade, a/k/a How Come One Team Has to Play with
Its Shoelaces Tied Together?, in INDUS. RELATIONS RESEARCH ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 240, 243-45 (1978) (reporting that union win rate declines with time
delay between petition and election); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD: ACTION NEEDED TO IMPROVE CASE-PROCESSING TIME AT HEADQUARTERS 63
(1991) (reporting that from 1960 to 1989, median time to decide contested representation
cases increased from fifty-four days to 212 days). The General Counsel had some success in the
1990s in reducing the time from petition to election. See Fred Feinstein, The Challenge of Being
General Counsel, 16 LAB. LAW. 19, 33 (2000) (reporting that as of February 1999, half of NLRB
initial elections took place within forty-two days of filing the petition); Press Release, NLRB
General Counsel Issues Report on FY 2003 Operations 6 (Dec. 5, 2003) (on file with the Iowa
Law Review) (reporting that median time from petition to election was forty-one days in FY
2002 and forty days in FY 2003).
62. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 59, at 78 (observing that delays "give employers a
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challenges to the size or scope of the proposed election unit-which
necessarily extend the period from petition to election by months if not
63years-are associated with decreased union chances for success. Neutrality
agreements can avoid the NLRB elections process altogether by providing
for card check recognition or for an election conducted by a third party
other than the Board, typically a private arbitrator or the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service ("FMCS"). 6' Either of these approaches, but
especially the increasingly standard card check approach, shortens the time
period within which the union attempts to secure majority support and be
recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative. Of even greater
importance, neutrality agreements-with or without card check-minimize
the prospects for delay in the initiation of collective bargaining once a
determination has been made that the union enjoys majority support.65
Unions that seek enhanced representational success through neutrality
agreements tend to do so in two distinct organizing contexts. First, they may
attempt to secure neutral status from employers with whom they enjoy an
ongoing collective bargaining relationship. This may occur in an industrial
setting when large, partially unionized companies have unorganized sectors
longer time period in which to campaign aggressively"); Roomkin & Block, supra note 61, at 76
(suggesting that "delay gives employers added opportunity to dissuade employees and increases
the likelihood of turnover in the workforce," thereby undermining unions' efforts to retain
employee support).
63. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 59, at 79-80; Ronald L. Seeber & William N. Cooke,
The Decline of Union Success in jVLRB Representation Elections, 22 INDUS. REL. 34, 42-43 (1983);
Prosten, supra note 61, at 244-46.
64. See Michelle Amber, Health Care Employees SEIU Local Wins Representation Rights for Some
2,500 Las Vegas Hospital Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-9 (Dec. 10, 1998) (reporting on
neutrality agreement between SEIU and a Las Vegas hospital providing for offsite election
supervised by FMCS); Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 47 (reporting that twelve organizing
agreements in the authors' dataset included provision for non-NLRB election); Erick Lekus,
H&M, Union Group Reach Agreement on Workers' Right to Collective Bargaining, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at A-3 (Dec. 22, 2003) (reporting on neutrality agreement between UNITE and clothing
retailer providing for election supervised by American Arbitration Association or similar
organization); see also Agreement on Election Procedures, supra note 47 (detailing private
election agreement that includes code of campaign conduct for both sides, plus election
supervision by pre-selected arbitrators).
65. The most egregious delays in the Board elections process actually occur after the votes
have been cast, when challenges to the results or conduct of the election typically take years to
resolve. See INT'L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICETU), INTERNATIONALLY
RECOGNIZED CORE LABOUR STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL
COUNCIL REVIEW OF THE TRADE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2004) [hereinafter ICFTU
REPORT FOR NATO] (reporting backlog of 25,000 employer unfair labor practice cases in 2002
and average time of 557 days for NLRB to resolve such cases, not including subsequent court
proceedings); Feinstein, supra note 61, at 34-35 (reporting that it typically takes two years to
litigate an unfair labor practice case to completion and that "[d] elay in resolving a challenge to
a union election victory can seriously undermine employee support and ultimately make it
impossible to achieve a collective bargaining agreement"). Neutrality and card check effectively
eliminate these delays because employers agree not to contest the result.
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that the existing union seeks to penetrate, 6 although it increasingly arises in
the service sector as well.67 Alternatively, unions may solicit a neutrality
agreement from an employer with whom they do not have a bargaining
relationship. Often, this kind of initiative arises in a service area context: the
Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Union ("HERE") or the Service
Employees International Union ("SEIU") may negotiate a neutrality
agreement with a hotel, hospital, or airport that is unorganized at the time.6"
C. WHYEMPLOYERS AGREE TO NEUTRALITY WITH CARD CHECK
At first glance, it is less obvious why employers would agree to negotiate
neutrality and card check provisions with unions, provisions that make it far
easier for their employees to become organized and pursue a collective
bargaining relationship. Professors Eaton and Kriesky have explored the
issue of employer motivation in a follow-up study using their same database
of neutrality and card check arrangements. 69 The thirty-four employers who
provided them with detailed information were for the most part heavily
unionized already, although roughly one-fourth had low union density.70
66. See, e.g., Union-Prepared Summary of Settlement Text Between URW and B.F. Goodrich Co.,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-3 (July 11, 1979) (quoting language from neutrality agreement
between United Rubber Workers and Goodyear); supra text accompanying note 24 (quoting
language from neutrality agreement between UAW and General Motors).
67. See, e.g., Michelle Amber, Unions Launch Drive to Organize Workers of Sodexho in United
States and Canada, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1, C-2 to C-3 (July 12, 2004) (describing
neutrality agreements between SEIU and two large nursing home chains, negotiated in each
instance to cover nursing homes other than those for which union and management had
already entered into a collective bargaining agreement); Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Trends:
Card-Check Proviso in Verizon Pact Sign of Broadening Organizing Trend, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at
C-1 (Sept. 6, 2000) (describing neutrality agreement between Verizon Communications and its
two major unions, covering more than 30,000 employees in Verizon's wireless operations).
68. See Walpole-Hofmeister, supra note 67, at C-3 (reporting that 90% of HERE's card
check provisions are part of stand-alone agreements not connected to existing collective
bargaining agreements); id. (describing recent SEIU card check success involving 650 skycaps at
Los Angeles International Airport, under a stand-alone agreement). HERE and UNITE have
recently merged to become UNITE HERE. See Michael Bologna, UNTE, HERE Delegates Approve
Merger; Leaders Call for Labor Movement Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-9 (July 9, 2004). This
Article refers to many organizing activities by the two unions that occurred before their merger.
69. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer
Motivations for Negotiating Neutrality and Card Check Agreements (Dec. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review). Professors Eaton and Kriesky conducted
telephone interviews with high-level human resource or labor relations executives from thirty-
four employers that had agreed to neutrality and card check. Id. at 2-4. The original list of 130
agreements was reduced to sixty-nine when the authors eliminated employers for whom the
actual contract language could not be obtained and also employers with a very small number of
employees and employers the union requested they not contact. Id. at 3. The thirty-four
respondents (a response rate of about 50%) included mostly employers in steel, auto assembly
and supply, hotel and gaming, and telecommunications. Id. at 4. Interviews lasted between
thirty and ninety minutes. Id.
70. Id at 4. Low union density meant less than 25%. Id
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Eaton and Kriesky found that a majority of employers identified as their
principal motive the costs they would incur if they did not agree to the
neutrality and card check language; they also found, however, that a
substantial minority of employers pointed primarily to the benefits derived
from reaching such an agreement.
71
In terms of avoiding costs, most employers referred to the economic
losses associated with a work stoppage, although many spoke of acting to
avoid potentially damaging picketing by the union.72 While the prospect of
lost business from a prolonged strike or lockout is fairly clear, there is ample
evidence beyond Eaton and Kriesky's database that picketing and
handbilling aimed at deterring customers also motivates employers to opt
for neutrality agreements.7" In addition, Eaton and Kriesky found that
employers would agree to remain neutral if the union was able to impose (or
threatened to impose) costs through the use of third parties-such as the
withholding of financial support or investment by a municipality or union
pension fund, or the withholding of customer business by religious or
community groups.74
Management did not simply succumb to these cost-avoidance pressures.
Indeed, most employers also projected costs associated with entering into a
neutrality agreement: these included increased labor costs from the ensuing
collective bargaining agreement, diminished attractiveness as a merger or
takeover target due to the neutrality agreement itself, and the possible loss
of a more cooperative work culture. 75 Many companies anticipated that such
costs would be relatively minor; some expected a low level of union
organizing while others believed their pre-existing good relations with the
union would yield a less onerous agreement in new facilities.7 6
As for employers who anticipated that increased labor-related costs
71. Id. at 6; see also id. at 6-9 (discussing six specific examples of employer reliance on
benefits flowing from neutrality arrangements); id. at 10-11 (reporting that, of the employers
providing information about the perceived costs associated with neutrality arrangements,
thirteen projected large or moderate additional costs, seven referred to low costs, and six
reported no costs).
72. Id. at 9-10.
73. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Local 226, "The Culinary" Makes Las Vegas the Land of tOe
Living Wage, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A22 (reporting that employers' concern over "pickets
and unhappy workers blocking [hotel] driveways" led numerous Las Vegas hotel owners to
agree to neutrality and card check); Hartley, supra note 8, at 390 n.U1 (reporting that union's
threat to picket led restaurant owner in Providence, Rhode Island and hotel owner in New
Haven, Connecticut to agree to neutrality agreements).
74. See Eaton & Kriesky, svpra note 69, at 10; see also Erin Johansson, Labor-Management
Partnerships as a Means to Employer Neutrality 2 (Dec. 14, 2003) (unpublished graduate
student paper, University of Maryland, on file with the Iowa Law Review) (discussing how major
benefits company serving union members uses a separate account to invest in new enterprises
in exchange for employer neutrality).
75. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 69, at 12.
76. Seeid. at 11.
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would be substantial, their willingness to agree on neutrality and card check
reflected either a belief that the costs of refusing to agree would be even
higher, or a perception that the costs of an agreement were offset by certain
benefits.7" Specifically, Eaton and Kriesky described a range of business-
related benefits that employers expected to realize as a result of entering
into organizing agreements. As was true of the identified costs, most of these
benefits, and some not mentioned in their study, are also reflected in other
accounts of neutrality and card check arrangements.
78
For many employers, neutrality agreements offer a marketing edge that
is valuable in attracting new business. One auto supply firm studied by Eaton
and Kriesky embraced neutrality because the UAW-which plays an
important role in sourcing decisions made by Ford, Chrysler, and General
Motors-then became its advocate in pushing the Big Three to increase
dealings with unionized suppliers.79 Hotels wishing to attract substantial
numbers of new visitors, and health providers seeking to expand their
patient base, have made comparable decisions: the neutrality agreements
negotiated include union commitments to advocate that their members
purchase the products or services the employers are providing. 80 Likewise,
unions' ability to convince supermarkets that they should favor producers
who pledge neutrality has encouraged agricultural producers to enter into
• 81
such neutrality arrangements.
Neutrality agreements also give rise to union-management partnerships
that can more effectively extract benefits from government. For instance,
Eaton and Kriesky report that a group of residential care facilities in
Massachusetts reached organizing agreements with SEIU in order to
82
enhance prospects for state financial assistance. Further, employers have
relied on the union support garnered from a neutrality agreement to assist
77. See id. at 13.
78. See sources discussed infra notes 79-81, 83-85, 88.
79. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 69, at 7; see also Parts Supplier Collins &Aikman Agrees to
Neutrality Pact with United Auto Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-9 (Oct. 16, 2003) (reporting
that fourth major auto parts supplier has reached neutrality and card check agreement with
UAW, and that company expects agreement will help it to achieve new business); Johansson,
supra note 74, at 5 (discussing CWA's support for merger activity within telecommunications
industry as part of 1993 neutrality agreement with AT&T).
80. See Convention Center Board Seeks Neutrality from San Diego Hotel Developers, Owners, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-8 (May 15, 2000) (describing special economic advantages for hotels that
house union conventions, and reporting on HERE's promise to steer union convention
business to San Diego if neutrality agreements are signed); Johansson, supra note 74, at 2
(discussing Kaiser Permanente's pledge of neutrality in exchange for unions' support of Kaiser
as preferred health plan for their combined 60,000 members).
81. See Bruce Rubenstein, Trade Group Charges Grower with Union Collusion, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 1998, at 23 (reporting that United Farm Workers has agreements with more than
4,600 supermarkets in North America, calling for the stores to favor growers or producers that
have pledged to remain neutral during campaigns to organize their agricultural workers).
82. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 69, at 7.
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them in passing or defeating legislation s8 and in securing favorable
regulatory results or judicial settlements.14 In addition, employers have been
given incentives to maintain peaceful and largely non-adversarial labor
relations during organizing campaigns in order to secure competitive
advantages as suppliers of goods and services to local governments.1
5
83. See, e.g., Kathy Robertson, Bill Ensures Profits for Nursing Homes, SACRAMENTO BUS. J.,
Aug. 20, 2004 (reporting on efforts by coalition of SEIU and major nursing home chains in
California to lobby for legislation that will increase government support for nursing homes). See
generally Victoria Roberts, Attorneys Cite Issues to Watch As Board Undergoes Political Shift, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), at B-i (Mar. 6, 2001) (reporting management attorney and former Board member
Charles Cohen's statement that many companies sign neutrality agreements in order to get
help from unions in the legislative and regulatory arenas). Cf CWA Wins 'Neutrality," "Card
Check" Rights from Bell Company, 63 TELECOMM. REPS. 11 (Apr. 21, 1997) (reporting that CWA
declined to support pricing flexibility legislation in Indiana that was favored by Ameritech-
Indiana because company did not agree to neutrality and card check; bill subsequently was
withdrawn from consideration).
84. See, e.g., HERE Local 814 Signs Initial Accord at Waterfront Hotel in Santa Monica, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-5 (July 12, 2001) (reporting that city government, as owner of land on
which hotel is located, made neutrality agreement a condition for approving hotel's sale to new
owners); Michelle Amber, Avondale, Unions Agree to Allow Workers to Decide if They Want
Representation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-l (Nov. 3, 1999) (reporting that as part of
neutrality and card check agreement, union and management would work together to resolve
all pending matters before NLRB and OSHA); Daniel J. Roy, Bahr More Receptive to Bell Atlantic,
NYNEX Merger: Likes Management Team, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-19 (June 3, 1996)
(reporting that union was withdrawing its opposition to proposed merger of two major
telecommunications companies; union emphasized that merged company would be run by
CEO with whom it had a constructive bargaining relationship that included a previously
negotiated neutrality agreement); Correction Notice, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-6 (Nov. 27,
1996) (reporting that MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas agreed to neutrality and card check
recognition in exchange for union's agreement to settle lawsuit regarding whether sidewalk in
front of hotel is private property).
85. See, e.g., MILWAUKEE COUNTY, WIS., ORDINANCE 31.01 (2000) (providing that county-
funded private employers furnishing human services to county residents must sign labor peace
agreement with any labor organization seeking to represent its employees, and that both private
employers and labor organizations must agree to a code of conduct designed to minimize strife
during an organizing campaign); San Jose, Cal., City Council Res. 68900, § I.C.3 (1999)
(providing for City office to review certain service or labor contracts in order to consider the
extent of city's vulnerability from effects of possible labor unrest and the type of assurances for
protections against labor discord that are offered by contractor). A number of states have
enacted, or are considering, legislation to encourage or require neutrality as a condition for
receiving state funds. See, e.g., State of New Jersey Exec. Order No. 20 (June 11, 2002); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 16645-16649 (West 2000); H.D. 630, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass, 2004);
H.D. 308, 92d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003).
Some of these state and local statutes may be preempted by the NLRA. See United
States Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.) (2004). But see Hotel
Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir.
2004) (holding that city ordinance requiring certain employers and contractors receiving
favorable tax treatment to sign a labor neutrality agreement is not preempted by NLRA); see also
Michelle Amber, California Compacts with Indian Tribes Include Provisions on Union Organizing,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-2 (Aug. 25, 2004) (reporting California governor's negotiation of
compacts with ten Indian tribes that already operate or plan to build casinos; compacts include
neutrality and card check as part of provisions outlining how casino workers can unionize, and
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Apart from expanding their base of customers and angling for more
favorable relations with government, employers have determined in certain
instances that neutrality agreements may enhance their ability to attract
qualified workers. Eaton and Kriesky report that language in the collective
bargaining agreements for many casinos in the Atlantic City market provides
for union recognition to be handled through card check when the casinos
add new properties."' According to the employers, the language was inserted
and retained because, when casinos have been desperate for skilled labor,
the unions involved (HERE and the building trades) have been able to
supply that labor, thereby adding value to the industry.
8 7
Finally, employers report that negotiating over the details of the
organizing agreement often promotes some of their larger labor-
management relations goals. Eaton and Kriesky found that following
employer promises of neutrality and card check, management has been able
to obtain a sympathetic union response to certain bargaining priorities, such
as allowing for subcontracting or accepting monetary concessions.
s8
In sum, employers, through their statements and actions, attest to a
wide range of business reasons for acceding to neutrality and card check.
One concern potentially triggered by these diverse motivations is whether
neutrality arrangements tend to arise where management is relatively "soft"
on unions, and accordingly whether unions might have prevailed anyway in
most of these settings by utilizing the traditional Board elections process.
While it is difficult to prove that neutrality agreements actually make a
difference, Professors Eaton and Kriesky tried to address this concern head-
on by soliciting employers' views on the matter. Employer responses
indicated overwhelmingly that neutrality and card check did affect their
behavior. g
In particular, most employers stated that they had wanted to preserve
non-union status whenever possible rather than build a cooperative
U.S. Department of Interior has approved the new language).
86. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 69, at 8 (describing management's emphasis on the
need for skilled labor); Telephone Interview with Professor Adrienne Eaton, Rutgers University
(Sept. 21, 2004) (notes on file with author) (identifying Atlantic City as the market referred to
in article).
87. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 69, at 8. The union representatives reported the same
history. Id.
88. See id. at 8-9. In addition, tradeoffs in bargaining may lead to union concessions within
the organizing agreement itself, such as banning home visits. See id at 8. Another bargaining
objective often sought by management in connection with neutrality agreements is a willingness
to combine or streamline job classifications. See Greenhouse, supra note 73 (describing Las
Vegas hotel owner's interest in having small number of job categories for dishwashers, maids,
and other hotel workers).
89. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 69, at 14-18. What concerns scholars and policymakers
sometimes seems more straightforward to "those on the ground." Eaton and Kriesky noted at
the outset of their discussion on this matter that "[m ] ost respondents found it odd that anyone
would think that the agreements don't make a difference." Jd at 14.
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relationship with existing unions, and a large majority reported strenuous
opposition to neutrality and card check within their own managerial
hierarchy.90 Yet despite such resistance and opposition at the front end,
employers stated that neutrality and card check made a substantial
difference in terms of management's behavior during organizing
campaigns.9 ' Indeed, while some employers reported that they were not the
most aggressive anti-union campaigners to begin with, 81% responded-
often with specific examples-as to how their behavior had changed after
signing neutrality agreements. 92 Eaton and Kriesky concluded that the best
explanation for why the employers they had studied chose not to oppose
unionization was simple economic rationality.93 In this respect, the decision
to accede to the prospect of a union, like the decision to resist that prospect,
is at root a matter of business judgment.
9 4
As -the studies and accounts discussed in Part I indicate, neutrality
agreements-generally accompanied by card check-have become a central
feature of the labor organizing landscape over the past decade. Unions find
them attractive for fairly obvious reasons. More intriguing is the fact that a
substantial number of employers have been persuaded to abandon the
aggressive stance they are entitled to adopt as part of an adversarial election
campaign. Indeed, an important aspect of what is distinctive about the
neutrality and card check approach is precisely its nonconfrontational
character. Whereas the "regulated" environment of a Board-supervised
election is highly competitive and adversarial, the self-regulated regime
under neutrality and card check is predicated on a pre-commitment to
restraint: both labor and management agree to reduce, if not eliminate,
their powers to challenge (and hence injure) the reputation and prospects
of their opposite number. I now consider whether such agreements to
forego certain informational and combative advantages traditionally
associated with campaign speech and conduct are themselves inherently
suspect under the NLRA.
90. See id. at 17-18. A substantial number of management respondents also stated they had
been criticized within the labor relations community of their own industry for agreeing to
neutrality and card check. Id. at 21-22.
91. Seeid. at 14-15, 22.
92. See id. at 15-16, 22. Employers explicitly referred to abandoning all use of videotapes,
employee meetings, outside consultants, -presentations on the pros and cons of unionization,
"cheap shots [on which] we used to pride ourselves," and informal supervisor discussion of
advantages and disadvantages. Id. at 15. Employers who reported that their response to
organizing had not changed usually had signed agreements with weak definitions of neutrality.
93. See id. at 22.
94. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 240-41 (13th ed. 2001) (discussing
economically based rationales that trigger employer hostility to unions); Freeman & Kleiner,
supra note 59, at 364 (concluding that firms behave in a rational profit-maximizing manner
when deciding to oppose unionization).
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II. THE BUSINESS CRITIQUE: DEFENDING EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
To put it mildly, not all employers or those sympathetic to the employer
position have accepted organized labor's new approach. Concern or
opposition has been expressed by a number of management attorneys and
business lobbyists, by certain members of Congress, and by some labor
relations scholars. Their challenges to the lawfulness of neutrality and card
check revolve around the claim that such arrangements usurp or undermine
the § 7 rights of individual employees. In essence, these critics contend that
employees' § 7 right to choose "to form, join, or assist labor
organizations... and... to refrain from any or all such activities " "s is
appropriately realized or vindicated only through a spirited election
campaign supervised by the NLRB, in which the employer and the union
each seek to inform and persuade employees as to the merits of their
respective positions. Arguments relying on the core legitimacy of Board
elections have been advanced recently in the congressional arena as well as
before the courts and the NLRB.
A. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION
In May 2002, seven Republican members of the House, including the
majority leader, introduced a bill to prohibit card check recognition. 96 A
similar bill introduced in May 2004 garnered fifty-seven Republican
cosponsors. 7 The proposed legislation seeks to modify § 8(a) (2) so as to
make it unlawful for an employer to recognize or bargain collectively with a
union that has not been selected through a Board-supervised election.
98
At two House hearings that considered the legislation during the
summer and fall of 2002, and a third hearing on the issue in the spring of
2004, the central theme among witnesses favoring the bill was the
importance of employee free choice. Testimony focused on the need to
protect such free choice through secret ballot elections following a
contested campaign in which employers as well as unions have spoken.
Professor Jarol Manheim, a political scientist, referred to card check and
neutrality as "a form of 'wholesale' organizing, in which the union needs to
95. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
96. See H.R. 4636, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002). The lead sponsor, Rep. Norwood, was chair of
the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections of the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce. In addition to Majority Leader DeLay, another key sponsor, Rep. Johnson, chaired
the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations.
97. See Secret Ballot Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4343, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004) (sponsor
count as of Oct. 19, 2004). The two lead sponsors, Reps. Norwood and Johnson, continue to
chair key subcommittees of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. See supra
note 96.
98. See H.R. 4343, § 3(a). The 2004 legislation also proposed to modify § 8(b) so as to
prohibit a union from causing or attempting to cause an employer to recognize or bargain
collectively in the absence of a Board-supervised election. See id. § 3(b).
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convince the company itself, in a sense, to turn over its workers-which is to
say, to withdraw from the contest."g0  Manheim acknowledged that
organizing would not succeed unless a majority of individual workers chose
to request union representation by signing cards, but he decried the absence
of a "regulated and competitive environment."0 0 Attorney and former NLRB
member Charles Cohen, representing the Chamber of Commerce,
emphasized that when neutrality and card check arrangements are in place,
the NLRB is effectively excluded. In Cohen's view, the inevitable
consequence of a process that has as its "ultimate goal... obtaining
representation status without a fully informed electorate and without a
secret ballot election" is to "undermine the right of free choice."'
The most comprehensive attack on neutrality and card check came
from business lobbyist Daniel Yager, on behalf of the Labor Policy
Association. 1 2 Yager's testimony included a chart contrasting the procedural
safeguards available in Board elections with the absence of such protections
in the card check process, as well as a list of over 100 Board cases since 1938
that allegedly involved union deception and/or coercion in obtaining card
signatures.'13 In concluding his testimony, Yager stressed that "the American
industrial relations system is founded on th[e] principle" that union
representation decisions "should be made by a majority of... individual
employees after hearing views on as many sides of the issue as possible" and
that the Board-supervised secret ballot elections process, while not perfect,
"guarantees confidentiality and protection against coercion, threats, peer
pressure, and improper solicitations and inducements by either the
employer or the union. ' °4
Like many congressional hearings in the labor relations arena,
testimony regarding the comparative virtues of union and management
approaches featured anecdotal accounts that were conflicting and less than
conclusive.'00  Further, although some supporters of the legislation
99. 2002 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 50 (statement of Jarol B. Manheim on July 23,
2002).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 100 (statement of Charles I. Cohen on Oct. 8, 2002); see also 2004 House Healing,
supra note 9 (statement of Charles I. Cohen on April 22, 2004) (maintaining that
neutrality/card check agreements amount to "'gag orders' on lawful employer speech [that]
limit employee free choice by limiting the information upon which employees make their
decision").
102. Yager testified in support of the 2002 bill and also wrote a detailed letter of support to
Rep. Ballenger shortly after the bill was introduced. See 2002 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 98
(statement of Daniel V. Yager, Labor Policy Association, on July 23, 2002). The Labor Policy
Association, recently renamed the Human Resources Policy Association, represents 200 large
companies that employ some 12% of the U.S. private sector workforce. Id.
103. See id. at 100.
104. Id. at 105.
105. At the 2002 House hearings, an individual employee and a mid-level manager testified
about their experiences of union pressure and intimidation to secure card signatures, while
[20051
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emphasized union use of corporate campaigns as the key technique for
pressuring employers into neutrality and card check arrangements,0 6 Eaton
and Kriesky's research suggests that employers do not view such campaigns
as an important strategy to secure either neutrality or card check. 10 7 It also is
worth noting the rather pointed irony of employers advocating passionately
the virtues of employee choice'08 while expressing "shock, shock"t 09 at the
prospect of coercion or pressure being brought to bear on individual
workers. Still, what emerges from House hearings in the past two Congresses
that is most relevant for our purposes is the rhetoric as well as the substance
of the business challenge to neutrality and card check. The labor
movement's approach to organizing is perceived as an assault on the
longstanding paradigm reflective of democratic employee choice-the
confidential, Board-regulated election that is claimed to be at once
competitive and unpressured.
There are members of Congress who do not share the belief that the
NLRB elections process should be the exclusive means for securing genuine
employee free choice. The "Employee Free Choice Act," introduced with
considerable support in the House and Senate, would require the Board to
certify a union that it determines has received majority support through
authorization cards, thereby precluding employers from insisting on a
Board-supervised election."0 Bill supporters contend that Board elections
several other employee witnesses described the employer pressure and intimidation they faced
both before and after an NLRB election, adding that neutrality plus card check was peaceful
and productive by contrast. Compare id. at 10 (statement of Bruce G. Esgar) (employee favoring
bill), and id. at 12 (statement of Ron Kipling) (manager favoring bill), with id. at 8 (statement of
Terry Geder) (employee opposing bill), Workrs' Freedom of Association: Obstacles To Forming a
Union: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 107th Cong. 48 (2002)
(statement of Eric Vizier) (same), and id at 118 (statement of Mario Vidales) (same).
106- See 2002 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 6-7, 101-05 (statements ofJarol Manheim and
Daniel Yager). Corporate campaigns involve a union's effort to accomplish organizing or other
labor relations objectives through its use of economic pressure tactics directed at a firm's
business dealings outside the labor relations arena (such as consumer actions, lobbying a firm's
creditors and lenders, or using public relations techniques to raise community awareness of a
firm's positions). See gener!yJames]. Brudney, To Strike orNot to Strike, 1999 WiS. L. REV. 65, 73;
Jarley & Maranto, supra note 44.
107. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 69, at 9-10 (describing employer responses that list
corporate campaigns as a minor anticipated cost of not agreeing to neutrality and card check);
Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, No More Stacked Deck: Evaluating the Case Against Card-Check
Union Recognition, PERSP. ON WORK, Summer 2003, at 19 (reporting, based on interviews with
both union and management representatives, that corporate campaigns are not a frequently
used strategy to secure neutrality or card check).
108. Compare Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996) (observing that "there
is nothing unreasonable in giving a short leash to the employer as vindicator of its employees'
organizational freedom").
109. Compare CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942) (remarks of Capt. Louis Renault).
110. See H.R. 3619, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1925, 108th Gong. (2003). As of October 19,
2004, the House bill, introduced by Rep. Miller (D-Cad.), had 208 cosponsors although only
seven Republicans; the Senate bill, introduced by Sen. Kennedy (D-Mass), had thirty-six
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are too often tainted by the inherently coercive environment of the
workplace, and that it is time for Congress to credit in formal terms the
decision by a majority of employees to choose union representation without
the need for an election."'
With two sizable groups of legislators advocating dramatically opposing
public policy solutions, it is likely that no legislative change will occur in the
near future. At the same time, it is clear that the election paradigm
continues to structure debate at the political level. This paradigm also
configures the terms of doctrinal disagreement as to whether neutrality
and/or card check are illegal under current NLRA law.
B. BASIC CHALLENGES TO THE LA WFUNESS OF NEUTRaLJTY AND CARD CHECK
The fact that critics of neutrality and card check are promoting
legislation to prohibit this organizing approach raises a modest inference
that the approach may be permissible under existing law. There are,
however, at least three distinct aspects to the argument that employer
agreements to remain neutral and abandon the elections process are
presumptively unlawful under the NLRA.1 2 I consider each of these aspects
and conclude that none is ultimately persuasive in light of the settled
doctrine or underlying purposes and policies of the Act.
1. Neutrality Agreements and § 8(a) (2)
Section 8(a) (2) makes it unlawful for an employer "to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it." 13 Some employer advocates
cosponsors, including two Republicans. Neither bill is likely to be given a hearing in a
Republican-controlled Congress.
111. See 2004 House Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Nancy Schiffer, Associate General
Counsel, AFL-CIO).
112. This Article addresses only challenges to the per se or presumptive lawfulness of
neutrality agreements and card check. If such arrangements are presumptively lawful, many
derivative or "as applied" issues remain. Examples with respect to neutrality include whether
unions may insist that employers bargain about neutrality; how neutrality arrangements are to
be enforced before arbitrators, the courts, or the Board; and the impact of NLRA preemption
principles on efforts by state or local governments to promote neutrality in their dealings with
employers or contractors. For thoughtful discussion of these issues, see George N. Davies,
Neutrality Agreements: Basic Principles of Enforcement and Available Remedies, 16 LAB. LAW. 215, 216-
22 (2000); Guzick, supra note 8, at 447-52, 460-67; Hartley, supra note 8, at 396-401, 404-08.
Recently, the NLRB announced it was considering whether to modify its well-settled
"recognition bar" doctrine in the context of neutrality and card check. See NLRB Order Granting
Review in Dana Corp. and Metaldyne Corp., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-1 (June 9, 2004). The
proposed modification would allow employees to demand a decertification election in a
shortened time period in order to challenge their employer's voluntary recognition of the
union based on a card majority. Although my position on this proposed change is
foreshadowed by the analysis presented in Part II.B, I do not address the issue directly in this
Article.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2000).
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have maintained that an employer's agreement to refrain from saying
anything negative about the consequences of unionization, to allow union
representatives to enter its facility and express pro-union views to its
employees, and to accept authorization card signatures as convincing
evidence of majority union backing, is tantamount to contributing unlawful
support or assistance toward a labor organization's success.' 1 4 In essence,
their argument is that such agreed-upon benefits, provided in advance of
any showing of employee support, confer upon the union in question a
favored status that operates to its continuing and unfair advantage in the
organizing process.115
Preliminarily, any contention that such favored status might unlawfully
interfere with the rights of a rival union is problematic. In its 1945 Midwest
Piping & Supply Co. decision, the Board determined that an employer
violated § 8(a) (2) by recognizing one of two competing unions after both
had filed election petitions. 116 However, this "strict" standard has since been
softened when reviewing an employer's determination to choose between
competing unions. In the decades following Midwest Piping, the courts of
appeals declined to follow the Board's approach in settings where there
were two competing unions and one had demonstrated majority support.117
In 1982, the Board itself modified what had become a more expansive
Midwest Piping doctrine."" Specifically, the Board held that it would no
longer find § 8(a) (2) violations in initial organizing settings where an
employer rejected the "colorable claim" of a rival union in order to
recognize a union that represented an uncoerced majority of employees."19
As the Board explained, Midwest Piping had operated to frustrate the
development of stable collective bargaining relationships by delaying
114. See Kramer et al., supra note 9, at 63-66.
115. Seeid.
116. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1069-70 (1945). Any union recognized by the employer must have
majority support, whereas a petition for election requires a showing of only 30% support. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 159(a), (e)(l).
117. Ser, e.g., NLRB v. Newport Div. of Wintex Knitting Mills, Inc., 610 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.
1979); Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 477
F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973); Modine Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1971). From the
courts' standpoint, an employer who recognized a majority-backed union was not rendering
unlawful support or assistance but rather "obeyting] the duty imposed upon him to recognize
the agent which his employees have designated." Playskool, 477 F.2d at 70.
118. See RCA del Caribe, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 963, 965 (1982); Bruckner Nursing Home, 262
N.L.R.B. 955, 957 (1982).
119. Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955. The Board continued to apply its "strict
neutrality" approach when two or more unions actually had pending election petitions. Id. at
957. It is worth noting, however, that such competition between unions in the election process
is very rare. Typically, elections involving two or more unions comprise only 3% of all
representation elections. See, e.g., 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 136 tbl.13 (1997); 61 NLRB ANN. REP.
132-33 tbl.13 (1996); 60 NLRB ANN. REP. 152-54 tbl.13 (1995). In addition, as noted above,
most circuits have rejected Midwest Piping altogether. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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recognition of majority unions while according minority unions the time to
gather support or simply to obstruct their rivals.120
Both the Board and the appellate courts have thus concluded that an
employer's determination to recognize a union based on majority card
support does not qualify as unlawful assistance against a minority union that
is already on the scene. It would seem apparent that an employer's less
intrusive decision-to remain neutral while a union seeks to garner such
majority card support-is similarly not an unlawful preference for one union
over another. It is not irrelevant in this regard that the projected threat to
competing unions rests on a rather imaginative premise of inter-union
rivalry in the neutrality setting. Many neutrality agreements arise in the
context of long-term relationships between unions and partially organized
firms, where union jurisdiction over the unorganized components is well
settled.' Even for neutrality agreements that anticipate new bargaining
relationships, the AFL-CIO constitution strongly discourages any organizing
competition among unions,12 and the highly unusual occurrence of inter-
union rivalries in the election setting suggests that unions will be
comparably reluctant to compete over neutrality agreements. 12
In the absence of a competing union, there remains the contention that
the favored status conferred by neutrality agreements directly undermines
employee free choice. Critics maintain that a binding agreement to forego
opposition effectively signals that the union enjoys a special status, and that
the employer's contractual expression of deference subtly but inevitably
constrains his employees in their decision about whether to support the
124
union. This argument questions the very legitimacy of an employer's de
facto willingness to facilitate arm's length union organizing. For several
reasons, the argument cannot withstand analysis.
Initially, it is difficult to understand why the contractual nature of an
employer's decision to refrain from objecting to a union should have an
unlawfully inhibiting impact on employees in their freedom to choose a
bargaining representative. Employers have the right to oppose unions in
their facilities, but they do not have a duty to do so. The NLRA permits an
employer to recognize a particular union voluntarily or to remain silent
120. See Bruckner Nusing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. at 956-57; see also RCA del Caribe 262 N.L.R.B.
963 (holding that an employer may continue to recognize and bargain with an incumbent
union despite a valid election petition from a rival union).
121. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing examples).
122. See Michelle Amber, Policies Allow Imposition of Further Sanctions Against Affiliates that
Violate Articles XX, XXI, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-5 (March 27, 2000) (describing procedures
and sanctions intended to discourage competing organizing among unions). The Board is
committed to minimizing competition between AFL-CIO unions, consistent with the goals of
the AFL-CIO Constitution. SeeNLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL §§ 11017-11019 (CCH 2004).
123. See supra note 119 (reporting that elections involving two or more unions occur only
3% of the time).
124. See Kramer et al., supra note 9, at 68.
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while that union campaigns among his employees, just as it allows employers
to express vigorously their opposition to unionization. The fact that an
employer's indifference-or even implicit receptivity-toward the union are
expressed in writing rather than through ad hoc oral declarations hardly
transforms the employer's voluntary stance into a coercive signal.
If anything, the NLRA for over fifty years has not only tolerated but
promoted contractual arrangements between management and unions as
conducive to labor peace. A key provision of the Taft-Hartley Act was § 301,
making collectively bargained contracts between unions and employers
enforceable in federal court.12 5 While the provision was inspired by a desire
to assure that unions, as unincorporated associations, could be held
responsible for contractual agreements comparably to employers, 126 the
baseline congressional understanding was that national labor policy is best
served when collectively bargained arrangements are deemed binding on
both parties.' 27 Respect for such arrangements, including employer
agreements to recognize a union upon proof of majority support secured
outside the elections context, has long been a centerpiece of peaceful and
stable labor relations.12 8 It is therefore not surprising that the Board and the
circuit courts have regularly encouraged voluntary recognition and
bargaining as a constructive alternative to elections.
12
9
The Supreme Court in the Bernhard-Altmann case did refer to the
possibility that a premature contractual agreement between employer and
union might provide a "deceptive cloak of authority with which [the union
could] persuasively elicit additional employee support."' s But in Bernhard-
Altmann, the employer had actually granted exclusive representative status to
a union supported by only a minority of employees.' 3' The Court expressed
125. Labor Management Relations Act (LRMA), Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136,
156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)).
126. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 80-105, at 15-16 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 46, 108-09
(1947).
127. See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 15-16; H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 46; 93 CONG. REc. 4265
(1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft); id. at 4410 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id. at A3232 (remarks of
Sen. Ball); id. at 7690 (remarks of Sen. Taft).
128. See Raley's, 336 N.L.R.B. 374, 385-86 (2001). See generally Goldsmith-Louison Cadillac
Corp., 299 N.L.R.B. 520 (1990); Alpha Beta Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 228 (1989); Cam Indus., 251
N.L.R.B. 11 (1990), enforced, 666 F.2d 411, 412-13 (9th Cir. 1982); S.B. Rest of Framingham,
Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 506 (1975).
129. See, e.g., Goodless Electric Co., 332 N.L.R.B. 1035, 1038 (2000), enforcemzent denied on
other grounds, 285 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2002); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464, 466
(1999); Int'l Union v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 558-60 (6th Cir. 2002); Hotel & Rest.
Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561, 566-68 (2d Cir. 1993); Hotel
Employees, Rest. Employees, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d 1464,1468 (9th Cir. 1992).
130. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736 (1961).
131. See id. at 734. The employer acted in the good faith but mistaken belief that the union
had secured majority support; the Court considered the employer's state of mind irrelevant to
§ 8(a) (2) liability in this setting. See id. at 738-39.
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a justifiable concern that in light of such premature recognition, any
subsequent support garnered from employees would likely be influenced by
the erroneous perception that the union was already their designated
representative. By contrast, a neutrality agreement involves no deception at
all: the employer is simply stating its readiness to allow union efforts to
secure majority support, and its wil-lingness to recognize and bargain with
the union should those efforts succeed. Even if the neutrality agreement
conveys by fair implication the employer's belief that a union contract would
be "mutually beneficial,"''  such predictive expression is surely no more
inhibiting than protected employer statements that a union contract will
impose costs and disharmony.
133
Moreover, from a practical standpoint the employees themselves are not
bound by neutrality agreements between employers and unions. Employees
who wish to express opposition to the union remain free to do so. Such
opposition may on occasion trigger hostility from the union or its
supporters, but instances of unlawful misrepresentation, pressure, or reprisal
can be fully addressed through existing Board procedures. 3 4 In addition,
trade associations and interested groups like the Chamber of Commerce or
the Human Resources Policy Association 135 also are not covered by neutrality
agreements. Such third parties are therefore in a position to respond to
employees seeking information on the disadvantages of unions, or to initiate
the dissemination of such information to all employees covered by a
neutrality agreement. To be sure, the Human Resources Policy Association
and the Chamber of Commerce will not have the same ready access to the
employees as the employer would. Still, their access is comparable to what
unions traditionally experience in our legal regime. 36
Accordingly, there is no basis for inferring that neutrality agreements
systemically inhibit the expressive options of employees who wish to oppose
132. Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 595 (1964).
133. Compare NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969) (holding that
employer statements as to probable adverse consequences of unionization that are beyond his
sole power to implement are protected expression, not violative of § 8(a) (1)).
134. See, e.g., Bookland, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 35, 36 (1975) (holding that union's
misrepresentations regarding the purpose or effect of signing a card result in its invalidation);
Planned Bldg. Servs., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1062-63 (1995) (holding that union's use of
threatening or intimidating conduct when soliciting cards is unfair labor practice, and cards
may not be used to establish majority support); see also United Stamford Employees, Local 680 v.
NLRB, 601 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that union's implied threat of lawsuit as
reprisal against employee for not becoming full union member is unfair labor practice); NLRB
v. United Mine Workers, 429 F.2d 141, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that union agents'
threats, participation in violence, and failure to discourage or repudiate violence by union
members in retaliation against employees holding a rival union meeting is unfair labor
practice).
135. See supra note 102 (describing this Association).
136. See generally Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); Cleveland Real Estate
Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457, 464-65 (6th Cir. 1996).
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unionization. Indeed, while Professors Eaton and Kriesky reported a
substantial success rate for unions in campaigns featuring neutrality
agreements, they also found that unions lost one out of five campaigns in
which they relied on both neutrality and card check and lost some one-half
of all campaigns involving neutrality agreements alone. 137 Some of these
results may be less favorable for union opponents than results obtained
through Board elections, but they do suggest that employees resisting
unions retain an effective voice.
Stepping back, the argument that an employer's formal neutrality
stance compromises employee free choice seems to rest, at bottom, on the
notion that § 8(a) (2) contemplates a fundamentally adversarial relationship
between management and labor. 138 If § 8(a) (2) is understood to condemn as
"collusive"139 any form of union-management cooperation that eliminates
management's expression of opposition, then neutrality agreements would
indeed be troubling. In historical terms, however, it is worth recognizing the
narrower or more focused setting in which § 8(a) (2) arose. The provision
was self-consciously aimed at eliminating in-house labor organizations
referred to as company unions, in order to permit the growth of truly
autonomous organizations that would engage in collective bargaining.
140
While company unions were characterized by a notable absence of
adversarial relations, it does not follow that the provision banning them
embraced such an adversarial stance.
When he introduced the bill in 1934 that eventually resulted in the
NLRA, Senator Wagner observed that employer-dominated unions had
"multiplied with amazing rapidity since the enactment of the [1933]
recovery law." 14' These organizations, initiated by management, were called
137. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 53; see also Hobbs, supra note 54 (reporting
unions' failure to organize a single new bargaining unit over a four year period in which
neutrality agreement covered thousands of Verizon Wireless workers).
138. See Kramer et al., supra note 9, at 64 (analogizing the NLRA structure to the adversarial
system of American justice, and claiming that even though unions and employers have some
incentives to cooperate, their clash of interests is an essential element to a fair accommodation
between them).
139. See id,
140. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 15-16 (1985) [hereinafter
NLRA LEG. HIST.I; To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Beore the Senate Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 73d Cong. 80 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra, at 27, 1 10 (exchange
between Sen. Wagner and William Green, President, American Federation of Labor)
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 2926]; id. at 9, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra, at 39 (statement
of Sen. Wagner); H.R. REP. No. 74-972, at 16-17 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra,
at 2956, 2972; II.R. RE'. 74-1147, at 16-19 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra, at 3046,
3065-68. See generally David Brody, Section 8(a)(2) and the Origins of the Wagner Act, in RESTORING
THE PROMISE, supra note 49, at 29, 34-36, 39-42.
141. 78 CONG. REC. 3443, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 15 (statement
of Sen. Wagner).
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"works councils" by some company executives 142 but more often identified as
"employee representation plans" ("ERPs"). 43 They reflected a workplace-
specific system of representation, generally restricted to a single plant and
ordinarily not involving collective contractual relations.
1 44
A centerpiece of the 1934 bill was the proposed abolition of these ERPs,
which Senator Wagner and his -allies viewed as a sham that undermined
meaningful collective bargaining. 145 The business community strenuously
objected to the proposed ban. Top executives testified in 1934 in support of
ERPs as genuinely democratic and supportive of labor stability.146 Employee
members of the ERPs echoed this testimony, insisting that their
organizations were not interfered with or controlled by their employers. 47
Senator Wagner and other bill proponents were wholly unpersuaded.
The 1935 revised bill that became law actually strengthened the language
prohibiting employer domination or control.148 Senator Wagner explained
that over two-thirds of the existing ERPs, or "spurious unions," had been
inaugurated since passage of the 1933 Recovery Act.149 He also detailed the
142. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 140, at 721, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra
note 140, at 757, 759 (statement of Arthur H. Young, Vice President, United States Steel Corp.).
143. See, e.g., id. at 732, reprinted in I NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 767, 770
(statement of Charles R. Hook, President, American Rolling Mill Co.); id. at 759, reprinted in 1
NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 795, 797 (statement of Ernest T. Weir, Chairman, National
Steel Corp.); id. at 813, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 810, 813 (statement of
Thomas M. Girdler, Chairman and President, Republic Steel Co.).
144. See Brody, supra note 140, at 34; Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE
WAGNER ACT: AFTER TEN YEARS 5, 19 (Louis G. Silverburg ed., 1945). See generally Hearings on S.
2926, supra note 140, at 781, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 818, 819
(statement ofJ.M. Larkin, Vice President, Bethlehem Steel Co.).
145. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 3443, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 15-16
(statement of Sen. Wagner); Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 140, at 100-01, reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEG. HisT., supra note 140, at 130-31 (statement of William Green); 79 CONG. REC. 9668
(1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 3151-52 (statements of Reps.
Marcantonio, Taber, Connery, and Bean).
146. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 140, at 719-64, 772-93, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG.
HIST., supra note 140, at 757-802, 810-31 (reporting statements from six top executives in steel
industry). For example, the Vice President of U.S. Steel Corporation extolled the "sincerity of
purpose [and] freedom of action and speech" promoted by the ERPs, id. at 759; the Chairman
of Republic Steel insisted that ERPs were free from undue employer influence or pressure, id. at
813, and the Vice President of Bethlehem Steel praised ERPs as creating a "friendly and
constructive atmosphere." Id. at 819.
147. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 140, at 795-882, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST.,
supra note 140, at 833-920 (statements from seventeen ERP members at various steel
companies).
148. See SEN. COMM. PRINT: COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73D CONG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH
CONG.) 2-3, 27, reprinted in I NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 1319, 1322, 1352 (clarifying
that new version of provision that became § 8(a)(2) prohibits employer from forming, not just
administering, a labor organization and bars employer from contributing "financial or other
support," notjust financial support).
149. See National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 74th Cong. 40 (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 1373, 1416
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various ways in which these ERPs undermined genuine freedom of self-
organization.5 0 The Congress that enacted § 8(a) (2) as part of the NLRA
voted for the Wagner framework, rejecting the business community's
alternative workplace representation system.' 5 ' Congress's purpose, however,
was not to oppose cooperation or accommodation between labor and
management. Rather, Congress opted to channel all labor-management
relations-whether cooperative or adversarial-through independent labor
organizations, especially those powerful enough to bargain collectively from
a regional or national perspective.'
The NLRA's opening declaration of policy emphasized the role that
collective bargaining could play in minimizing industrial unrest and
increasing employees' purchasing power, objectives that in turn would
bolster the then-fragile condition of the economy. 153 Although such statutory
policy statements typically feature as much rhetoric as substance, there is no
doubt that Congress in 1935 regarded the advent of genuine collective
bargaining as likely to reduce the pervasive and costly effects of labor-
management conflict while also promoting the democratic virtues of
meaningful self-government in the workplace.154 Consistent with these
aspirations, the legislative history includes statements from supporters
indicating that § 8(a) (2) would not prohibit employers from "influencing"
their employees in a pro-union direction through non-threatening
communication in the workplace.'l The same legislative history also conveys
Congress's sense that employers wishing to move in this cooperative
(statement of Sen. Wagner) [hereinafter Wagner Statementl.
150. See id. (identifying four key deficiencies of company unions: (i) employees are unable
to band together with workers from other companies to deal "intelligently and effectively with
problems of wages or hours that are regional or even national in scope"; (ii) employees'
selection of representatives is restricted to those working for same company, imposing
limitations on experience and expertise; (iii) employer financial and logistical support for
employee representation effort puts employer on both sides of table; (iv) employer participates
in internal management, or in formation of bylaws of the labor organization, sapping the
organization's independence).
151. See SEN. REP. No. 74-573, at 9-11 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note
140, at 2309-10; HR REP. No. 74-972, at 15-17 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra
note 140, at 2956, 2971-73.
152. See Wagner Statement, supra note 149; Brody, supra note 140, at 39-44 and sources cited
therein. See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 94, 108-
09, 136 (1950); Keyserling, supra note 144, at 19.
153. See29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
154. See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory
Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 948-51 (1996), and sources cited therein.
155. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 149, at 305, reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST.,
supra note 140, at 1691 (statement of Chairman Walsh); SEN. COMM. PRINT, supra note 148, at
27, reprinted in I NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 1352; see also Hearings on S. 2926, supra
note 140, at 60-62, reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140, at 88, 90-92 (statement of
Professor Sumner Slichter) (describing collective bargaining as effort by each party to influence
the positions and policies of the other).
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direction should have to deal with unions that are truly independent rather
than labor organizations that rely on the employer for their existence.
156
This historical perspective is not meant to suggest that neutrality
agreements automatically fall outside the ambit of § 8(a) (2). The line
between employer-union cooperation (which is encouraged) and employer
support constituting undue interference -(which is prohibited) remains
important and is at times difficult to identify.157 Employers may inhibit their
employees' choice in unlawful ways, by helping the union to solicit signed
authorization cards, 158 by designating particular employees to assist the
union in its organizing effort, 59 or by convening a meeting between the
union and employees at which supervisors are present and are viewed as
monitoring employees' reactions.' 60 Moreover, an employer's unlawful
assistance to a union organizing campaign may justify the voiding of a
recognition agreement even if the general counsel fails to establish "with
mathematical certainty that the union lacked majority support" at the
moment it was recognized. 6
On the other hand, simply arranging for a meeting between union and
employees on company premises, or allowing the union to solicit cards
during the workday, do not constitute unlawful employer support and in fact
fall within. permissible instances of employer-union cooperation. 6 2 The
Board for decades has eschewed adopting a rule that would prohibit
employer consent to any on-site organizing efforts. Instead, it has followed a
"totality of the circumstances" approach on these matters, considering as
relevant factors the pattern of conduct manifesting employer support,
156. See SEN. REP. NO. 74-573, at 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 140,
at 2309-10. See generally Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1465-89 (1993).
157. See NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968) (discussing need
to find balance between encouragement of cooperation that fosters stable and peaceful
industrial relations and discouragement of interference that undermines employee freedom of
choice).
158. See Packing House & Indus. Servs. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 688, 694 (8th Cir. 1978) (finding
§ 8(a)(2) violation when employer assisted in efforts to solicit signed cards during worktime);
Windsor Place Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. 445, 448-49 (1985) (same); B.F.G. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 489, 491 (1978) (same).
159. See Keller Ladders, 405 F.2d at 666-67 (finding § 8(a) (2) violation).
160. See NLRB v. Vernitron Elec. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding
§ 8(a)(2) violation); Duane Reade, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 943, 943-44 (2003) (same).
161. See Duane Reade, 338 N.L.R.B. at 950.
162. See, e.g., Tecumseh Corrugated Box Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 1, 3, 6 (2001) (finding no
§ 8(a)(2) violation by employer who convened mandatory meeting of employees during which
an official from new management told employees that new owners liked to work with unions,
then introduced a union representative and left the room; cards were solicited during meeting
that followed); New England Motor Freight Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 848, 851-52 (1990) (finding no
§ 8(a) (2) violation by employer who advised half his employees that union representatives were
on premises and allowed these representatives to address employees for organizational
purposes on the premises during working hours).
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management's direct involvement in any on-site exchanges between the
union and employees, and whether a rival union is present on the scene and
therefore subject to being disfavored.1
6 3
The doctrinal position adopted by the Board, and the appellate courts
as well, indicates there is nothing presumptively suspect about employer
statements that encourage employees to look favorably on an imminent
• . 164
organizing effort by an outside labor organization. It would seem even
clearer that employer communications expressing a neutral stance toward
such imminent organizing, or announcing a refusal to participate in the
organizing campaign, are likewise not suspect as unlawful support violative
of § 8(a) (2). The relevant legislative history, discussed above, strengthens
this inference by locating neutrality agreements between employers and
independent unions presumptively on the lawful side of the division
between cooperation and support. While there may be instances of abuse in
terms of implementation, an employer's announced willingness to allow his
employees to debate on their own the merits of whether to support these
independent unions in their pursuit of collective bargaining is simply not
the kind of "mischief" that § 8(a)(2) was designed to address.16
5
2. Neutrality Agreements and Waiver of the § 8(c) Right to Communicate
Section 8(c) protects employers' freedom to speak out against
unionization, so long as this sharing of views "contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit."' 66 Enacted in 1947 after the Supreme Court
163. See Coamo Knitting Mills, 150 N.L.R B. 579, 582 (1964) (articulating a totality of
circumstances approach, and noting that absence of a rival union makes finding of unlawful
support less likely); New England Motor Freight, 297 N.L.R.B. at 851 (reaffirming this approach as
supported by repeated Board precedents).
164. See, e.g., NLRB v. Midwestern Pers. Servs., Inc., 322 F.3d 969, 977-78 (7th Cir. 2003)
(discussing multifactor approach for distinguishing between lawful cooperation and unlawful
interference); Vernitron Elec. Components, 548 F.2d at 26 (same); Keller Ladders, 405 F.2d at 667
(holding that the NLRA is not violated "[sbo long as the [employer's] acts of cooperation do
not interfere with the freedom of choice of the employees").
165. Importantly, this historical perspective distinguishes neutrality agreements from
another form of labor-management cooperation: workplace-specific employee participation
programs that management has supported and organized labor has opposed. Because those
efforts at cooperation have arisen outside the framework of autonomous labor organizations,
the Board and courts have found them to be almost inevitably in violation of § 8(a)(2) the
employer support structure is simply too analogous to the ERP framework rejected by Congress
in 1935. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1161-70 (7th Cir. 1994), enforcing
309 N.L.R.B. 990, 999 (1992); Keeler Brass Auto. Group Div. 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114-16
(1995); E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895-96 (1993).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000). The text of § 8(c) sets forth an evidentiary rule more than
an actual right: while employer communication "shall not constitute or be evidence of any
unfair labor practice," such communication may still serve as grounds for the Board to order a
new election under its § 9 powers. See generally Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236,
1245 (1966). For present purposes, however, I assume that the protection confers a positive
right to speak.
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had warned that Board restrictions on noncoercive employer speech raised
constitutional questions,' 7 § 8(c) was meant to permit and indeed
encourage employer debate on issues related to union organizing and
bargaining) It has been contended that neutrality agreements are
incompatible with the letter and spirit of § 8(c) because they amount to the
waiver of a fundamental employer right,- a waiver that runs contrary to
federal labor policy. 169 This subsidiary challenge to the lawfulness of
neutrality provisions is without merit.
Accepting arguendo that employers' right to engage in noncoercive
speech during a union campaign implicates First Amendment
considerations,70  such a right may be waived if done "voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly... with full awareness of the legal
consequences.",71 Neutrality agreements that are sufficiently explicit typically
satisfy this standard without difficulty. Waiver provisions negotiated by
relatively sophisticated, institutional parties, between whom there is little or
no disparity of bargaining power, are regularly deemed voluntary.172 These
provisions will likely be found knowing and intelligent, given the fact that
the union ordinarily has foregone other demands, or has made specific
promises, in exchange for the employer's neutrality pledge; in addition, the
agreement will be enforceable by the employer should the union fail to
honor its commitments.' 73 While there may be circumstances in which an
employer's agreement to remain neutral during an organizing campaign was
delivered under duress, or without an adequate understanding as to its
meaning, such occurrences are likely to be exceptional.
There remains the possibility that even a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver may be invalid on public policy grounds. Here, it has been
asserted that any agreement by an employer to remain silent during union
organizing should be held to contravene federal labor policy, principally
because it undermines the § 7 rights of employees. The argument is that to
167. See NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469,477-79 (1941). See generally Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1945).
168. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966). As the Court in Linn
observed, Congress in 1947 was specifically focused on preventing the Board from imputing an
anti-union motive to employers' conduct based on their earlier speeches or publications. Id. at
62-63 n.5; see H.R. REP. No. 93-510, at 45 (1947) (Conference Report).
169. See Int'l Union, UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating
company's argument); Kramer et al., supra note 9, at 72-76.
170. SeeNLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1970).
171. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (setting forth standards for
waiver of due process rights in civil context).
172. See id. at 187-88. See generally Guzick, supra note 8, at 458-59.
173. See Guzick, supra note 8, at 458-59. Compare Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398
U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that union may waive certain statutory rights, acting as collective
bargaining agent to relinquish rights that had been available to employees); Pilon v. Univ. of
Minn., 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that sophisticated employees negotiating
individually at arm's length may waive Title VII rights as part of litigation settlement).
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permit the employer to be silent compels employees to choose for or against
unionization without adequate information.'7 4 The problem with this
contention is that federal labor policy-as expressed in statutory and
decisional law--does not command employers to resist unionization in
order to educate employees about its vices or virtues. As the Ninth Circuit
has succinctly observed, "lnlothing in the relevant statutes or NLRB
decisions suggests employers may not agree to remain silent during a
union's organizational campaign-something an employer is certainly free
to do in the absence of such an agreement." 75 If anything, neutrality
agreements, as employer-sponsored communications, would seem
themselves to be protected by § 8(c). Moreover, honoring collectively
bargained neutrality agreements actually promotes federal labor policy by
respecting both parties' decisions to forego reliance on a potentially more
divisive elections process'7 6 and by signaling more generally a preference for
voluntary (and peaceful) resolution of union-management differences.'
77
Finally, the employer's waiver is of its own statutorily protected right to
speak during a union campaign; the waiver does not deny employees' § 7
rights to organize or refrain from doing so. Section 7, of course, conveys no
right to receive any particular information from one's employer; if it did, an
employer's ad hoc decision not to participate in an organizing campaign
would be suspect. Nothing in the Act requires an employer to oppose or
speak against unions. That an employer is protected in doing so under §
8(c) is a response to congressional pressure to allow employers to speak, not
employee demands to be informed. 7 In any event, as discussed earlier, both
174. See Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 559 (reciting employer's argument); Hotel Employees,
Rest. Employees Union, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d 1464, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
175. HotelEmployees, 961 F.2d at 1470.
176. See, e.g., Baseball Club of Seattle (Seattle Mariners), 335 N.L.R.B. 563, 564-65 (2001)
(holding that employer must abide by neutrality agreement, and dismissing its decertification
petition); Verizon Info. Sys., 335 N.L.R.B. 558, 559-61 (2001) (holding that union must abide
by neutrality agreement, and dismissing its representation petition); see also N.Y. Health &
Human Serv. Union, 1199/SEIU v. NYU Hosps. Ctr., 343 F.3d 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2003)
(compelling employer to arbitrate its dispute with union regarding alleged violations of special
rules of conduct, pursuant to parties' agreement that governed pre-election campaign
colnlnunications). See generally supra sources cited in notes 128-29.
177. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (describing origins of § 301 and
congressional emphasis on desirability of honoring and enforcing labor-management
agreements through the legal system); see also Airline Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78
(1991).
178. The legislative history to § 8(c) reflects the clear understanding of both supporters
and opponents that the purpose of this provision was to protect employers' right of free speech,
by prohibiting the Board's past practice of using employers' speeches and publications
concerning labor organizations or collective bargaining as evidence that a subsequent employer
act was undertaken with illegal motive. See H.R CON. RE'. No. 80-510, at 45 (1947). The
record is replete with indications that the provision was meant to allow employers to be heard,
at their discretion, without being penalized; there is no evidence at all that Congress
contemplated an audience right to receive information. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 33
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employees and interested business groups remain free to express or
exchange views as to why unionization should be opposed.' 79 There is simply
no basis for believing that employees opposed to unionization are unable to
assert their own § 7 rights, even if one were to indulge the rather strained
premise that an employer's interest in renouncing a voluntary agreement
reflects his role as benevolent champion for these third party employees. 8 °
3. Card Check Recognition and Actual or Presumptive Coercion
As noted earlier, roughly two-thirds of all neutrality agreements include
a provision for recognizing union majority status through card check
procedures."" Critics have suggested that reliance on signed authorization
cards to determine employee choice should be only a last resort because
card signatures are obtained in presumptively unreliable circumstances.
182
Unlike NLRB elections, there are no formal conditions or procedures that
can help structure a card solicitation campaign. In particular, several
attributes of Board elections-the privacy of the voting booth, the anonymity
of a secret ballot, oversight by a federal agency-seem dedicated to
protecting freedom of choice when compared with the group-oriented, face-
to-face, and relatively open-ended nature of the card signature process.
Taking note of such differences, the Supreme Court in its 1969 NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co. decision declared that cards were "admittedly inferior to
183the election process" as a means of reflecting employee choice. At the
same time, the Gissel Court made clear that authorization card signatures
may serve as an adequate reflection of employee sentiment.18 4 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied in part on the fact that Congress-when
enacting the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947-had debated and
deliberately rejected a proposal to eliminate the use of authorization
cards. 185 The Court also considered and dismissed claims that the card-
(1947); S. REP. No. 80-105, at 23-24 (1947): 93 CONG. REc. 7487 (1947) (veto message of
President Truman); 93 CONG. REc. 3953 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft); id at 4261, 4266 (1947)
(remarks of Sen. Ellender); id. at A3233 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Ball).
179. To the extent that an employer claims his § 8(c) rights must be preserved in order to
vindicate the § 7 interests of third party employees, he would seem to lack standing to assert
and litigate such a claim. See Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 559. See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975).
180. Compare Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996) (expressing doubts as
to the "benevolence" of an employer acting "as its workers' champion against their certified
union").
181. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 46-47; supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
182. SeeYager & LoBue, supra note 9, at 28-30, 41-44.
183. 395 U.S. 575, 603 (1969).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 598-600 (detailing history of Taft-Hardey amendments, including express
decision to allow for two tracks of securing majority support: certification following a victory in
a Board-supervised election, and voluntary recognition based on card check, without the special
privileges accorded to certified unions).
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signing process was inherently unreliable due to group pressure, lack of
sufficient information being shared, or the presence of misrepresentation
and coercion. 8 6 Four years later, in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v.
NLRB, the Court held that employers were not required to accede to a card
majority showing, but could instead force the union to invoke the Board's
election procedure. Employers, however, were still permitted to recognize a
union based on its card majority. Indeed, the Linden Lumber Court
emphasized the importance of "getting on with the problems of
inaugurating regimes of industrial peace," and it implicitly viewed voluntary
recognition as furthering that laudable objective. 88
More broadly, non-electoral pathways to securing representative status
have been approved under the NLRA since its inception. From 1935 to
1947, the Board had statutory authority to certify a union as majority
representative based on the showing of a card majority; i s9 in its early years,
the Board relied extensively on authorization cards for this purpose.190
Congress in 1947 specified that Board certification would be available only
following NLRB election victories, but employers still were required to
recognize and bargain with a union "designated or selected... by the
majority of the employees," language that has been understood to
encompass designation methods other than a Board election.' 9'
Both before and after 1947, employers whose unfair labor practice
conduct disrupts the Board's election process or otherwise vitiates clear
evidence of union support have been required to bargain based on a card
majority. 19 2 Employers may also be required to recognize a union based on
186. See id. at 602-04 (holding that card drives will typically be accompanied by some
employer information-sharing, and that group pressures on individual employees that
accompany card-signing efforts are equally present in typical election campaign).
187. 419 U.S. 301,309-10 (1974).
188. See id. at 306-07 (observing that unions faced with unwilling employers will promote
stable labor relations more quickly by filing for election than by pressing unfair labor practice
charges). Similarly, it may be inferred that unions faced with willing employers will
"inaugurate... regimes of industrial peace" more quickly by reaching voluntary agreement
rather than filing for election. Id. at 307.
189. See Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (authorizing Board certification
by secret ballot elections or "any other suitable method to ascertin [sic]" that the union has
majority support).
190. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 680-82 (Patrick Hardin & John Higgins Jr. eds., 4th
ed. 2001) and sources cited therein (discussing Board's extensive reliance on authorization
cards to sustain certification in 1935-1939 period).
191. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000). Congress, in the Taft-Hartley Act, deleted from § 9 the
phrase allowing certification via "any other suitable method." The 1947 statute did not change
the "designated or selected" language quoted in the text accompanying this note, and Congress
rejected a House version of the bill that would have allowed employers to refuse to bargain with
unions that secured majority support without winning a Board election. See NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597-98 (1969); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 190, at 690.
192. See Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 702-04 (1944) (employer disrupted
election process); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 339-40 (1940) (employer's
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evidence of majority status that they themselves have solicited or collected-
such as a third party card check or an employer-conducted poll or
interrogation. Thus, while the "preferred" status of recognition via
election is reflected in the benefits that accompany Board certification,
194
there are a range of circumstances in which a card showing or other proof of
majority support is sufficient to require that employers bargain with their
union.
In addition, employers have always been permitted to enter voluntarily
into a bargaining relationship with a union that possesses a card majority. 95
An employer may do so spontaneously, in response to the union's
presentation of signed cards from a majority of employees. Alternatively, an
employer may contract in advance to accord representative status to the
union if and when a majority card showing is made 96 One recurring
example of this latter type of contractual arrangement involves collective
bargaining agreements that provide for employees in newly acquired
facilities to become part of the existing bargaining unit through the majority
choice mechanism of card signatures. When reviewing legal challenges to
such "additional facility" clauses, the Board has made clear that it will give
full effect to the parties' contractual commitments so long as there is a valid
card check process that protects the new employees' right to self-
determination. 197 In its leading case on this subject, the Board concluded
that employers who enter into such card check agreements have effectively
waived their right to a Board election:
To permit the Employer to claim the very right which it has
unfair labor practices undermined previously stipulated majority support); see also United Mine
Workers v. Ark. Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-75 (1956) (holding that union supported by card
majority may lawfully engage in recognitional picketing and strike when employer fails to
accord recognition).
193. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1263 (1975) (third party card check);
Nation-Wide Plastics Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 996, 996 (1972) (employer poll); E.S. Merriman & Sons,
219 N.L.R.B. 972, 973 (1975), enforced in 570 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1978) (interrogation).
194. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (C) (establishing protection against recognitional picketing
by rival unions); id. § 159(c)(3) (establishing one year bar on new election petitions by rival
unions or employees seeking decertification); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954) (upholding
as reasonable Board's requirement that a certified union's status must be honored for a full
year as against claims that the union no longer represents majority of employees); NLRB v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 267, 272 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating that certified union's status
must also be honored by successor employer during this one year period). See generally Gi.ssel,
395 U.S. at 600 n.17.
195. See generally Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318; Franks Bros., 321 U.S. 702. As explained
in the text accompanying note 191 supra, § 9(a)'s provision that representatives may be
"designated or seected" (emphasis added) by a majority of employees contemplates that employers
and employees may agree to enter into a collective bargaining relationship without waiting for a
Board-supervised election.
196. See Goodless Elec., 332 N.L.R.B. 1035, 1038 (2001), and cases cited therein.
197. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975); Central Parking Sys., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B.
390 (2001).
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forgone, perhaps in return for concessions in other areas, would
violate the basic national labor policy requiring the Board to
respect the integrity of collective-bargaining agreements.'98
This basic national policy-deferring to labor-management bargains
that waive the right to utilize the Board's election machinery-also applies
to unions when they attempt to escape from the provisions of card check
agreements. In Verizon Information Systems, a union and employer that had
bargained for a neutrality and card check provision later disagreed on the
scope of the applicable unit.' 99 The union, frustrated with the employer's
position in the unit scope dispute, filed an election petition with the Board,
but the Board dismissed the petition.2 0 ° Noting that the union had already
invoked the neutrality and card check provisions in seeking to organize the
employees, and that the employer had shared useful information regarding
employee names and locations, the Board concluded that "the fundamental
policies of the Act can best be effectuated by holding the Petitioner to its
bargain."2°'
The well-settled line of authority holding card check agreements to be
valid and enforceable is consistent with the broader principle that both
labor and management should be held accountable for their contractual
undertakings. Indeed, encouraging management and unions to resolve their
differences on a voluntary and peaceful basis-through agreements that are
individually tailored and privately enforceable-has long been a
fundamental tenet of federal labor policy 0 2 This tenet reflects the special
role that Congress assigned to collective entities under the NLRA. Unions
(acting on behalf of a substantial number of employees) and management
(responding to a group claim for recognition) have the power to invoke the
Board's election machinery. 2"s They also may forego the exercise of this
power and agree on other means for determining majority preferences.
While card check agreements cannot waive individual employees' rights
under § 7, those statutory rights do not include the right of an individual
employee to demand a secret ballot election. As the Board recently
reiterated in this regard, "voluntary recognition based upon a card majority
is a favored element of national labor policy and the Board has expressly
198. Kroger, 219 N.L.R.B. at 389; see also Central Parking, 335 N.L.R.B. at 390 (quoting
Kroger).
199. 335 N.L.R.B. 558, 559 (2001).
200. See id. at 559-61.
201. Id. at 560; see also Lexington House, 328 N.L.R.B. 894, 895 (1999) (holding union to its
express promise to refrain from organizing certain employees, and dismissing union's election
petition).
202. See generally NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952); NLRB v.
Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1978); MGM Grand Hotel, 329
N.L.R.B. 464,466-67 (1999).
203. See29U.S.C.§§ 159(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
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stated that there are no countervailing policy considerations that preclude
enforcing such agreements."
2 4
In addition to having no right to a secret ballot election, individual
employees have no statutory privacy right to keep their union sentiments
secret from the union. The Board in 1966 concluded that a union showing
enough support to file an election petition had the right to obtain lists of
employee names and addresses because of its legitimate need to
communicate with, and identify, potential supporters during an organizing
campaign.205 The employees' relatively modest privacy interest in not having
to be visited at home by union representatives was required to yield to the
union's need.10 6 The same reasoning applies with respect to the even more
modest privacy intrusion of being asked to sign an authorization card at
work.207
The fact that recognition of valid card majorities-and contractual
agreements to be bound by such majorities-are presumptively lawful does
not mean that card majorities themselves are always lawfully obtained. Those
soliciting employees' signatures may provide inaccurate information as to
the content or import of the cards, they may exert' considerable pressure on
employees to sign, or they may promise benefits as an inducement for
signatures. The Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and the Board have all
been attentive to such concerns and have established that signed cards may
20" 209be rejected based on sufficient showings of misrepresentation, coercion,
or improper promise of benefits.
210
204. Cellco P'ship, No. 4-CA-30729, 2002 WL 254221, at *2 (N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel,Jan. 7,
2002) (rejecting individual employee's claim that he had a right to a secret ballot election). The
established absence of such a statutory right is presumably one of the motivations for the bills
requiring elections as the sole approach to employee choice. See supra Part II.A.
205. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242-43 (1966).
206. See id. at 1241 n.10, 1244 & n.20.
207. See Cellco P'ship, 2002 WL 254221, at *3-4 (rejecting individual employee's claim that
card majority recognition provision interferes with his "right" to keep his representational
preferences secret from his union); see also Randall Warehouse, 328 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1035-38
(1999), remanded on other grounds, 252 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing numerous decisions
supporting union's right "to determine the identity and leanings of employees" during
organizing campaigns).
208. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding
that certain cards were improperly solicited based on oral misrepresentations, and accordingly,
bargaining order premised on majority support would not be enforced); Bookland, Inc., 221
N.L.R.B. 35, 36 (1975) (holding that card was improperly solicited based on oral
misrepresentations).
209. See, e.g., Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870, 877 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that union coerced
certain employees into signing cards, and accordingly employer's good faith doubt as to
majority status justified refusal to bargain); Planned Bldg. Servs. Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1062-
63 (1995) (holding that union intimidated employees while soliciting cards, and accordingly
the cards could not be used to establish majority support).
210. See, e.g., NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 277-81 (1973) (holding that a union
offer of fee waiver in exchange for authorization card signatures warranted invalidating election
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At the same time, the Board and the circuit courts have been cautious
when evaluating signers' testimony that relies on earlier circumstances or
states of mind, especially when that subjective testimony conflicts with the
overt action of having signed cards.2 1 In this respect, they have perhaps
been mindful of the Supreme Court's belief that "employees are more likely
than not, many months after a card drive and in response to questions by
company counsel, to give testimony damaging to the union." 212 Over the
years, the Board's position has basically remained that clearly expressed
authorization cards are presumed valid, but the presumption may be
overcome by proof that signatures resulted from misrepresentation or
coercion.2 13 This two-step approach has allowed the Board and the courts to
invalidate card authorizations obtained by means of excessive pressure,
deceptive information, or improper benefits while rejecting such challenges
as factually unsupported in other instances.1 4
More recently, courts reviewing the enforceability of neutrality and card
check agreements have been sensitive to the importance of assuring
employee freedom of choice. When deciding that such agreements are
enforceable under § 301 of the LMRA, courts have been careful to consider
whether an agreement provides employees with a fair opportunity to decide
for themselves to accept or reject the union.21 The presence of a card check
arrangement qualifies as such an opportunity, again absent proof that the
particular implementation of this arrangement was somehow coercive or
otherwise suspect.2
16
results under Board's § 9(c) authority); Claxton Mfg. Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 417, 417 (1981)
(holding that ambiguous union statements indicating no initiation fee for cards signed before
election but possible initiation fee for cards signed after election warranted setting aside
election results).
211. See Marie Phillips Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 340, 341 (1969) (discussing NLRB v. Cactus
Petroleum Inc., 355 F.2d 755, 760 n.8 (5th Cir. 1966)).
212. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969); see G.KD.C., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B.
258, 259 (1997) (relying on Gisselin this regard).
213. See Bookland Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 35, 36 (1975) (finding misrepresentation that
overcomes presumption); Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732, 733 (1968) (finding no
misrepresentation); Glomac Plastics, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 406, 409-10 (1971) (finding coercion
that overcomes presumption); Boston Pet Supply, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1891, 1899-1900 (1977)
(finding no coercion).
214. Compare, e.g., Burlington Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 1982)
(finding unlawful misrepresentation), and Pulley, 395 F.2d at 877 (finding unlawful coercion),
with VanDorn Plastic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding no
unlawful peer pressure), Dayton Hudson Dep't Store Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 795, 797-805 (1994)
(finding no unlawful forgery), and Gaylord Bag Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 306, 306-07 (1993) (finding
no unlawful promise of benefits).
215. See, e.g., Hotel & Rest. Employee Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561,
566 (2d Cir. 1993); Hotel Employees, Rest. Employees Union, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961
F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1992).
216. SeeJP. Morgan Hotel 996 F.2d at 566 (citing cases from several circuits); Marriott Corp,
961 F.2d at 1468 (distinguishing unlawful agreement imposing union representation on all
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In the end, there is no evidence of widespread or systemic misconduct
associated with card signatures, and no reason to believe that existing
instances of misconduct are not being adequately addressed through case-
specific review of alleged abuses. When combined with the history of
reliance on cards in a range of settings-including when conditions for a
fair election exist-and the strong policy favoring voluntary labor-
management agreements in general, it seems clear that employers'
willingness to recognize unions based on a card majority does not raise any
serious problem of legality under the NLRA.2 17
A common theme to the legal contentions reviewed in this Part is the
assumption that employers and unions are meant to oppose one another as
adversaries, at least until the union wins its majority. Implicit in this theme is
the notion that the union's legitimacy stems from its having prevailed in a
spirited contest for the minds of employees, characterized by the free flow of
competing information and arguments. These legal contentions, and their
implicitjustification, do not survive scrutiny. Neutrality agreements and card
check fit within an exceptional but always available doctrinal alternative,
premised on the idea that employees can make genuinely free choices when
management and union decide together to modify or forego the traditional
Board-supervised election campaign.
As Part I indicated, however, reliance on neutrality and card check over
the past decade has in practice gone well beyond the exceptional. The
widespread use of a larful approach predicated on contractually based
employees of facilities acquired in future from lawful agreement to accept results of a card
check).
217. As was true for neutrality itself, see supra note 112, there are derivative or "as applied"
issues with respect to card checks. One involves whether an employer-union agreement may
address specific terms or conditions of employment that the parties agree will be set in place
once a majority of employees choose to be represented (via cards or even election). In Majestic
Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964), enforcement denied on procedural grounds, 355 F.2d 854 (2d
Cir. 1966), and some related decisions, the Board suggested that such pre-recognition
provisions violate § 8(a) (2) when a rival union is present. Id. at 859-60. Other developments
have cast doubt on these holdings, at least where no rival union exists. See, e.g., Coamo Knitting
Mills Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 580-83 (1964); Memorandum from Harold J. Datz, Associate
General Counsel Division of Advice, NLRB, to Bernard Gotifried, Regional Director Region 7
(June 2, 1986) (on file with the Iowa Law Review), http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/
shared_files/admemo/admemo/o060286_gm.pdf. The General Counsel's most recent
pronouncements, however, indicate more willingness to challenge neutrality agreements that
commit labor and management, even conditionally, to any substantive terms or conditions of
employment. See NLRB General Counsel Rosenfeld's Report on Unfair Labor Practice Allegations
Involving Neutrality Agreements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-1, E-4 (Nov. 18, 2004) (hereinafter
Rosenfeld's Report). A second issue is whether a union's request for a neutrality plus card check
arrangement constitutes a recognition demand, triggering the employer's right to insist on a
Board election. The NLRB has answered this question in the negative. See Brylane L.P., 338
N.L.R.B. 65 (2002); New Otani Hotel & Garden, 331 N.L.R.B. 1078 (2000). This Article does
not address these interesting issues--they do not go to the underlying lawfulness of neutrality
plus card check.
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cooperation rather than relatively unbridled competition thus presents a
challenge to the long-prevailing notion that Board-supervised elections are
the best and most accurate method of ascertaining what employees want.
Accordingly, despite the weakness of the various doctrinal contentions
raised by business advocates, their underlying conceptual arguments warrant
further attention.
III. CHALLENGING THE ELECTION PARADIGM
Historically, elections have long been the primary mechanism relied
upon to determine whether employees wish to be represented by a union.
Even after Congress in 1947 declined to identify election victories as the
exclusive avenue for requiring that employers engage in collective
2181bargaining, the Board in the ensuing twenty years concluded that the
absence of an election was itself sufficient grounds for employers to refuse to
bargain. 2 9 The Supreme Court in Gissel and Linden Lumber endorsed the
reasonableness of the Board's conclusion, observing that "[ellections have
been.., and will continue to be held in the vast majority of cases."22 °
This description of the predominance of the elections process in the
organizing context is linked to the normative position of elections as the
morally legitimate pathway to vindicate employees' freedom of choice. The
Board over a period of decades has recognized certain instances in which
the employer's unlawful conduct, or its independent initiative to assess
employee desires, triggers a binding role for authorization cards.
Notwithstanding such exceptions, however, the Board's preference for the
elections process rests on the belief that elections are most likely to reflect
the well-informed, uninhibited, and genuine choices of individual
employees. As recently as 1997, the NLRB Chairman appointed by President
Clinton reaffirmed this fundamental behavioral premise at a congressional
hearing.2
In short, the use of Board-supervised elections to determine what
employees really want has been established as our reigning explanatory
theory or paradigm. For decades, this paradigm has been accepted as
descriptively accurate and normatively satisfying within the relevant public
218. See Becker, supra note 4, at 513 (citing sources); discussion supra text accompanying
note 185.
219. SeeAaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1966); Becker, supra note 4, at 513-14
(reviewing development of Board position from 1947 to 1966). This sufficient ground was
subject to employers not having engaged in serious misconduct during the election campaign.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 591-92 (1969).
220. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 607; see also Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v.
NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 302-10 (1979) (sustaining Board's holding that employer is not liable
under Act solely on basis of its refusal to accept non-electoral evidence of a union's majority
status).
221. Hearing Before House Government Reform and Oversight Subcomm. on Human Res., 104th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of William B. Gould IV, Chairman, NLRB).
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policy community. In order to understand why the election-driven approach
may warrant modification or abandonment, I invoke by analogy the work of
Thomas Kuhn, a historian of science who has offered an account of how
significant change occurs in the structure of the natural sciences. By
referencing Kuhn's sociological explanation for major shifts in perception
within the scientific community, I hope to shed light on the need to rethink
our election-centered approach to ascertaining employees' true preferences
regarding the identity, or presence, of their collective bargaining agent.
A. KUHN'S THEORY OF PARADIGMS AND ScaENT1FIc CHANGE
According to Kuhn, experimentation or puzzle-solving in normal
science takes place against the backdrop of an accepted theory or organizing
set of beliefs-a paradigm.22 There are always anomalies or unsolved
puzzles; the highly precise and intrusive techniques of scientific discovery
are applied to work out the problems defined in the paradigm. At some
critical level, however, a tolerable amount of anomaly turns into an
intolerable amount.
Movement from one paradigm to another is rarely straightforward,
because the established consensus around a given paradigm is an obstacle to
rapid or even predictable change.223 Further, scientists are not all struck
simultaneously by a bolt of paradigm-related lightning; there must have
been some heretical thought occurring in advance. When enough anomalies
cannot be solved, or when different practitioners reach enough conflicting
solutions, the scientific community begins to disagree about the conceptual
and procedural rules of the game. What emerges from such quarrels is
ultimately a mobilization of the community to embrace a new paradigm, an
event partly accounted for in sociological and psychological terms, not
simply by reference to rational or neutral experimental techniques.
224
Kuhn's emphasis on the social psychology surrounding scientific
discovery has been vigorously challenged.2 2 5 At the same time, his theory has
222. See KUHN, supra note 1, at 10 (defining paradigm in context of normal science).
Kuhn's book first appeared in 1962; the enlarged second edition, to which reference is made
here, was published in 1970. My brief presentation draws principally on Kuhn's work, as set
forth in his book and in contemporary exchanges with other scholars. See generally CRITICISM
AND THE GROWrH OF KNOWLEDGE (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970); KARL R. POPPER,
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (rev. ed. 1968).
223. See KUHN, supra note 1, at 10-35 (discussing formation of paradigms and puzzle
solving as part of normal science); id. at 52-76 (discussing the emergence of anomalies and
scientific discoveries that can stimulate challenges to a reigning paradigm).
224. See id. at 77-83, 94-95, 109-10, 148-50, 154-59, 166-67.
225. See, e.g., Stephen Toulmin, Does the Distinction Between Normal and Revolutionaiy Science
Hold Water?, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 222, at 39, 44-46
(contending that major shifts in scientific perceptions occur without significant disruption of
the research programs or sociological structure of the scientific community); John Watkins,
Against "Normal Science," in CRITICISM AND THE GROWrH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 222, at 25,
33 (criticizing Kuhn's view of scientists as constituting a religious community in which
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obvious relevance to the social sciences, where the objects of study are events
experienced and given importance by other human actors, rather than data
generated and defined within the research community itself.
22 6
Growth of knowledge in law, as in the social sciences, involves attempts
to describe events that are generated and assigned significance by
nonacademic actors.22 7 As Professor Edward Rubin has observed, our efforts
to understand and evaluate a pattern of legal events-in this instance agency
and court decisions implementing certain legislative enactments-involve
normative as well as descriptive elements. 28 Knowledge in the law is
inevitably influenced by the backgrounds and motivations of both the
participants who shape the law's direction and the observers who seek to
explain and evaluate that direction; decisionmakers and scholars are
"involved" in the events they describe in a way that chemists or physicists are
not.2 19 In this setting, Kuhn's theory of how paradigm shifts may contribute
to fundamental changes in our understanding has something to offer.
There is room to debate whether the election paradigm reflects a vision
of labor relations as requiring an election in order to assure employee free
choice, or simply a recognition that an election is the best of many fallible
mechanisms available in an imperfect world. In either case, the discussion
that follows maintains that the election-centered vision has failed to address
the increasingly anomalous results associated with its invocation as the
structure on which to predicate employee free choice. Accordingly, as
Kuhn's famous analysis of scientific revolutions suggests, the increased
intellectual, political, and practical tension between Board-supervised
elections and neutrality plus card check may well reflect an emerging
revolutionary change is tantamount to a spiritual catastrophe).
226. See Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WISC. L. REv. 521, 525-
26 (describing data, on which national scientists rely, as "a passive subject of research that must
be generated by the discipline itself" (even in fields that "rely heavily on observation" as
opposed to experimentation), and contrasting this with events, on which social scientists and law
professors rely, and which are not "discovered" in laboratories or nature but produced by other
human beings).
227. See id. at 525-26, 539-40 (discussing similarities between legal methodology and social
science in this "reactive" respect). Such similarities do not mean that legal and social science
models necessarily assess judicial decisions or other legal events in the same way. See generally
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary
Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997).
228. See Rubin, supra note 226, at 542 (identifying the "defining feature" of legal
scholarship as its prescriptive voice).
229. See id. 544-45; see also Cross, supra note 227, at 309-11 (contending that descriptive
and normative research into judicial decisionmaking should take account of the attitudinal
model advanced by political scientists as well as neutral reasoning factors relied on by legal
scholars); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (contending that judicial behavior is best understood as a
function of incentives and constraints imposed on judges by various legal systems, and
discussing how incentives and constraints for administrative law judges will differ from those for
appellate judges).
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recognition of the need to change paradigms when explaining and justifying
employees' right to bargain collectively through "representatives of their
own choosing. ,
230
B. THE ELECTION PARADIGM AND IMPEDIMENTS TO EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
1. The Elections Regime as a Kuhnian Paradigm
The regime of Board-supervised elections furnishes both a descriptive
account of how employees decide whether to be represented by a union and
a justification as the fairest means for the exercise of freedom of choice.
Encouraged by Congress's 1947 decision to codify employers' right to free
speech, the Board proceeded to regulate union organizing on the
hypothesis that employers and unions would-and should-campaign like
political candidates for the support of presumptively undecided voters.2"'
Over more than fifty years, the election paradigm has helped shape the
strategic and litigation approaches adopted by labor and management.
Concomitantly, the election paradigm has guided the Board and the federal
courts in their development of supplemental hypotheses, and their pursuit
and resolution of various puzzles or anomalies arising under these
hypotheses.
Initially, the Labor Board, in the late 1940s and early 1950s established
the "laboratory conditions" doctrine. 32 Under this "scientific" approach, the
Board viewed the representation election as an "experiment," invoking its
supervisory authority over such elections to identify and cultivate optimal
settings for determining the uninhibited preferences of employees.
23
During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Board and courts addressed the
complex implications of the laboratory conditions approach, delineating in
fine-grained detail the contours of objectionable campaign conduct. Among
the puzzles that the Board and courts investigated under laboratory
conditions were the precise line to be drawn between lawfully predictive and
unlawfully threatening employer speech,23 4 the coercive implications of
employer or union promises of benefits during an election campaign,2 3 5 and
230. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
231. See Becker, supra note 4, at 545-47 (discussing importance of § 8(c), enacted as part of
Taft-Hartley, in establishing employers' right to campaign as if they were candidates seeking
employees' support).
232. See generally Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), enforced in 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952).
233. See id. at 127; see also DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 190, at 446-95; Becker, supra
note 4, at 547-50.
234. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969); Dal-Tex Optical Co.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
235. See, e.g., NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964) (examining employer's
promised benefits); NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973) (examining union's promised
benefits).
[2005]
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the impact on employee free choice of employer misrepresentations. 36
Apart from the laboratory conditions doctrine itself, the Board has dealt
with problems involving various procedures that govern the elections
process, including the criteria for determining appropriate election units.237
Well into the 1990s, agency and judicial decisionmakers also struggled with
issues of competitive access to the electorate, establishing a framework that
they believed would afford employers and unions sufficient contacts with
employees as voters while not unfairly advantaging one side or the other.
Beyond the organizing context, the Board and courts continue to probe the
circumstances that justify elections as a means to test employers' subsequent
doubts regarding whether the union they have bargained with still enjoys
majority support from their employees.,2
9
Both the NLRB and the federal courts have explored this array of
public policy challenges from within the framework of the elections model.
The long-invoked but problematic analogy between union democracy and
political democracy lends rhetorical authority to this model, reinforcing the
presumption that Board-supervised elections will accord the most durable
form of protection for untrammeled employee choice. Yet, if one views
reliance on Board-supervised elections as a paradigm under Kuhn's account,
one can see how this basic approach has remained unchallenged even as
many serious anomalies have arisen. The assumption that an election-based
regime provides the only, or the most satisfactory, basis for promoting and
protecting the employee free choice that the statute seeks has long since lost
its validity in the U.S. labor law setting. The reasons for this failure have
been well documented by others; I will simply summarize them here.
236. See, e.g., Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982); Gen. Knit of Cal., Inc.,
239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978); Shopping Kart Food Mkt. Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977); Hollywood
Ceramics Co. Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
237. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass'n. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 615-17 (1991) (approving as
reasonable the Board's rule defining types of employee units appropriate for collective
bargaining in hospitals); NLRB v. Purnell's Pride Inc., 609 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 1980)
(identifying eleven factors on which Board relies when deciding if there is appropriate
"community of interest" to approve a requested election unit); Pac. Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577
F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a regional director is not required to share with
employer the authorization cards used to justify calling of election); E&R Webb, Inc., 194
N.L.R.B. 1135, 1136 (1992) (stating that Board will not require election to proceed while
substantial unfair labor practice charges are pending).
238. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (limiting access of union
organizers); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Co., 516 U.S. 85 (1997) (granting access to union
salts); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1952) (allowing employer to deliver
"captive audience" speeches except in last twenty-four hours of campaign); Excelsior
Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240 (1966) (allowing union access to list of employees
with home addresses once election schedule has been set).
239. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2001) (establishing elections as the
preferred means for employers to withdraw recognition, by establishing lower standard that
employers must meet to trigger a decertification election than the standard that must be met to
withdraw recognition unilaterally from an incumbent union).
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2. Deterioration of the Election Paradigm
Preliminarily, there is the uncertainty and delay associated with
scheduling the representation election and determining voter eligibility.
Unlike political elections, which occur on fixed dates, established well
before and independent of the campaign itself, union elections may occur
anywhere from several weeks to some months after a petition is filed.240 The
election date typically is not set until some time after both sides have begun
officially campaigning. 41 In addition, the initial date may be postponed for
months by employer challenges to the scope or precise definition of the
unit, and post-election objections by the employer may delay any action on
242the results for years. These delays and challenges tend to involve questions
about which employees should be allowed to vote, quIestions resolved by the
Board on a case-by-case basis under a rather flexible "community of interest"
standard.24 Uncertainty as to election timing and voter eligibility contributes
to the contentious atmosphere that so often surrounds the elections process.
Employers who oppose unionization understand that election delay and
244litigation challenges diminish the ultimate chances for union success.
Employees, made aware of the uncertainties and obstacles accompanying
efforts to modify the status quo, may be subtly yet unmistakably discouraged
240. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 68, 82 (reporting median time from
petition to election of roughly fifty days in 1993, about the same as in late 1970s and 1980s; 20%
of elections occur more than two months after petition); Press Release, supra note 61, at 6
(reporting median time from petition to election of roughly forty days in 2002; 7.5% of
elections occur more than fifty-six days after filing of petition).
241. The Board encourages employers and unions to agree on the scope of the election
unit and other election details in order to avoid the time and cost involved in a hearing. Still,
the election campaign will be well under way by the time such an agreement is reached. If the
parties cannot agree, the Regional Director conducts an investigation, often including a
hearing; by the time an election date is fixed, the campaign will have been going on for weeks if
not months. See NLRB, FY 2003 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORI 19-20 (2004),
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/reports/gpra%20performance%20report%20fy%202003 /%20
mar%201%202004.pdf (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
242, See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 23 (2000)
[hereinafter UNFAIR ADVANTAGE] (discussing unit scope challenges and consequent delays);
Feinstein, supra note 61, at 34-35 (reporting two year delays due to litigation in late 1990s).
243. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2000) (authorizing NLRB to determine what is an appropriate
bargaining unit on case-by-case basis); Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 576
(1st Cir. 1983) (discussing Board's weighing of eight distinct factors when applying its
community of interest standard). See generally HARPER, ESTREICHER, & FLYNN, supra note 58, at
281-95.
244. SeeJohn Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the "Union Free" Movement in the U.S.A. Since the
1970s, 33 IND. REL.J. 197, 200-01 (2002) (reporting that anti-union consultants and law firms
regularly advise management on how to object to the size and composition of the bargaining
unit, and teach managers how to file frivolous complaints with the NLRB in order to delay the
elections process, thereby eroding employees' confidence in the effectiveness of both the union
and the Board).
[2005]
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from maintaining interest.
245
More important than delay, however, is the impact on employee free
choice during campaigns of employer speech and conduct that is approved
under the Board-administered election paradigm. The law as interpreted
246
permits employers to restrict employees' speech with co-workers, while
forcing them to attend meetings at which carefully scripted managers
"predict" various dire consequences if their employees decide to form a
union.2 47 Not surprisingly, employers make use of the intense pressure
tactics at their disposal in an overwhelming majority of election
campaigns.24  Union organizers who might be expected to counter
employers' dire predictions, and to offer their own arguments, may be
excluded from the worksite altogether in almost all circumstances. 49
The stark inequality between employer "incumbents" and union
"challengers" regarding rights of access to, or speech aimed at, the voters
would be unthinkable in an ordinary partisan election setting. In light of
these conditions, individual employees attending sophisticated captive
audience speeches, or participating in one-on-one encounters with their
immediate supervisors, may understandably feel intimidated if not coerced
by a series of oral, written, or electronic communications linking "union
presence" to reductions in force, facility closings, and permanent
replacement during a lawful economic strike.250 Even if an employer does
245. See, e.g., UNFAIR ADVANTAGE, supra note 242, at 69-70, 82-85 (describing how "the slow
unfolding of the legal mechanisms and the availability of appeal after appeal" undermine the
majority support for unions); Richard W. Hurd & Joseph B. Uehlein, Patterned Responses to
Organizing: Case Studies of the Union-Busting Convention, in RESTORING THE PROMISE, sutpra note
49, at 61, 64-66 (providing examples). Moreover, because unions have come to understand the
importance of securing employers' consent in order to hold elections in a "timely" fashion, they
often must yield to employers on issues involving the size or scope of the bargaining unit and
the length of the campaign so as to avoid endless litigation. See Becker, supra note 4, at 533-35.
246. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958); Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945).
247. See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 428-29 (1953) (allowing captive audience
speeches); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (allowing predictions but not
threats).
248. See ICFTU REPORT FOR WTO, supra note 65, at 3 (reporting that 92% of employers in
contested campaigns force employees to attend closed-door meetings, and 78% subject
employees to one-on-one meetings with their supervisors).
249. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992).
250. See, e.g., UNFAIR ADVANTAGE, supra note 242, at 71-74 (reporting that employers
threaten to close workplace in 50% of U.S. organizing campaigns); ICFTU REPORT FOR IATO,
supra note 65, at 3 (reporting that employers threaten to relocate their business in 71% of all
campaigns involving "non-mobile" manufacturing industries); Brudney, supra note 106, at 69-
71 (discussing origins of permanent replacement doctrine in 1938 Supreme Court decision,
and reporting substantial increase in employers' use of permanent replacements during
economic strikes since 1980). Unions can respond with home visit', but the worksite is where
the real campaign action occurs; access to workers' homes is a poor substitute given the reality
of increasingly anonymous suburban residential patterns and individuals' concerns about
privacy and security when they are visited at home by strangers. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor,
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not immediately follow through on such lawful or borderline lawful
predictions, their repeated expression is quite likely to affect employees as
they contemplate the range of subtler deprivations that union supporters
may face in the future.
The role of unlawful employer campaign activity-notably employers'
willingness to terminate or otherwise discipline union supporters-further
damages the possibilities for a genuinely free choice in the elections context.
Academic observers have relied on annual Board reports to demonstrate
that discriminatory conduct against employees increased at an astounding
rate between the late 1950s and 1980; this remarkable pattern of employer
misconduct persists in robust form today.25' By 1990, there were incidents of
unlawful termination in fully 25% of all organizing campaigns: one out of
every fifty union supporters in an election campaign could expect to be252
victimized by such conduct. A more recent study estimated that by the late
1990s, one out of every eighteen workers who participated in a union
251
organizing campaign was the object of unlawful discrimination. It is also
notable that over the past two decades, employer unfair labor practices have
become more heavily concentrated in mid-size and larger establishments,
where union election win rates remain substantially lower.
2 54
Given the pervasive employer practices of lawful and unlawful resistance
Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. RFv. 305, 331-32 (1994); Jay Gresham,
Note, Still as Strangers: Nonemployee Union Organizers on Private Commercial Property, 62 TEX. L. REV.
111, 159-60 (1983).
251. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Sef-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1779-80 (1983) (reporting that unfair labor practice charges
against employers rose 750% from 1957 to 1980 while the number of elections rose only 50%;
the fraction of such charges found meritorious rose from 29% in 1960 to 39% in 1980); see also
Charles Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the NLRA and RLA, 2
EMP. RTS. & POL'YJ. 327, 331 (1998) (showing that between 1992 and 1997, more than 125,000
workers received back pay under NLRA because they had been retaliated against for union
activity). The strikingly high level of unlawful conduct by employers has not abated since 1980.
Indeed, while the annual number of representation elections declined by 64% between 1980
and 2003 (from 7,296 to 2,333), the number of unfair labor practice charges against employers
fell by less than half that proportion, 30% (from 31,281 to 21,765). Compare Weiler, supra, at
1779-80 (presenting 1980 data), with Number of Elections, supra note 36 (reporting 2003 election
figures), and 68 NLRB ANN. REP. tbl.2 (2003) (reporting 2003 employer ULP figures). Similarly,
the average of 21,000 employees per year receiving back pay from 1992-1997, see Morris, supra,
at 331, remains at least that high today. See 68 NLRB ANN. REP. tbl.4 (2003) (reporting 23,144
employees received back pay from their employer in 2003).
252. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 70. The incidence of illegal firings rose
from one in twenty elections in the 1950s to one out of four as of 1990. These firings affected
one in 700 union supporters in the 1950s, but one in fifty by 1990. Id.
253. See Morris, supra note 251, at 330.
254. See NLRB ANN. REP. tbl.18 (1982, 1988, 1994, 1997) (showing ULP charges against
employers with fewer than ten employees comprised 26% of all charges in 1982 but only 10% of
all charges in 1997, whereas charges against employers with more than 100 employees
comprised 35% of all charges in 1982 but 48% in 1997); supra notes 49-50 and accompanying
text (reporting differential union win rates by size of establishment).
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to unionization-practices that have intensified in recent decades-it is
hardly surprising that 40% of all non-union, non-managerial employees believe
their own employer would fire or otherwise mistreat them if they campaigned for a
union.as In addition, more than half of all employees who say they want to
be represented by a union report that management resistance is the
principal reason they do not have one.2 5r A recent study of worker attitudes
nationwide estimated that 44% of all private sector employees in the United
States would opt for union representation if given a genuinely free chance to
exercise their choice.2'7
Finally, the absence of any effective remedy protecting employee free
choice in the face of such practices reinforces the ominous message for
union supporters. In principle, when the employer's unlawful conduct is
severe enough to have "interfere[d] with the elections process and tend[ed]
to preclude the holding of a fair election," the Board may compel the
employer to bargain based on the union's pre-election showing of a card
majority. " Apart from serving as a deterrent against employer misconduct,
these initial recognition bargaining orders were described by a unanimous
Supreme Court as the best way to "effectuat[e] ascertainable employee free
choice" based on conditions as they existed before the employer's pattern of
firings and unlawful threati.259 Yet, since the 1960s, the appellate courts have
severely restricted the availability of this remedy by repeatedly reversing
255. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 75 (reporting 41% figure based on
1991 Fingerhut-Powers poll); see also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 117 n.25 (reporting that 43% of employees responding in
1984 Harris Poll thought their employer would fire, discipline, or otherwise retaliate against
union supporters).
256. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 30-37, 60-62, 86
(1999) (discussing methods for conducting national Worker Representation and Participation
Study in 1994-1995, and reporting that 55% of non-union employees who said they wanted a
union gave management opposition as the main reason for there not being one); see also Phil
Comstock & Maier B. Fox, Employer Tactics and Labor Low Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE,
supra note 49, at 90, 91, 98 (reporting, based on over 150,000 interviews of employees involved
in organizing campaigns during fourteen year period in 1980s and 1990s, that 36% attributed
votes against union representation to pressure from management, including specifically fear of
job loss); Paul Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at 50, 23 HARV. J. ON 1,EGIS. 1, 11
n.18 (1986) (reporting, based on 1983 polling data, that 38% of all employees surveyed would
not join a union because of company pressure). Managers in non-union firms often perceive
themselves as effectively compelled to maintain this intense anti-union climate. See FREEMAN &
ROGERS, supra, at 88 (reporting that one-third of non-union managers believe it would hurt
their career if the employees they manage successfully form a union; more than half of that
number think it would hurt their career a great deal). For a very recent account of how a major
U.S. company relies on a range of anti-union techniques to influence employee choice, see
Steven Greenhouse, At a Small Shop in Colorado, Wal-Mart Beats a Union Once More, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2005, at A] 7.
257. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 256, at 89.
258. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969) (stating Board's current practice
as of late 1960s).
259. See id. at 612, 614.
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Board-issued bargaining orders. The persistent hostility to bargaining
orders reflects in large part the courts' faith in elections as a more legitimate
form of determining what employees really want. 26 ' The Board's appetite for
pursuing this remedy has diminished sharply in the face of widespread
judicial resistance, and the number of bargaining orders imposed each year
has fallen from over 100 annually (when ;Gissel was litigated and decided in
the late 1960s) to a mere fifteen per year by the early 1990s.
262
The election paradigm in its current form is no longer descriptively
accurate or prescriptively justified. The findings and studies referenced here
indicate that, far from protecting or advancing employee free choice, the
Board-supervised elections regime regularly tolerates, encourages, or
effectively promotes a range of coercive conditions that preclude the
attainment of such employee choice. Even in formal terms, the elections
process is in certain respects less sensitive to employee autonomy in
choosing for or against union representation than are the rules governing
recognition through card check. For example, the elections regime
authorizes employees' representation preferences to be determined under a
less rigorous majority-support standard;263 it tolerates misrepresentations of
fact and law in an elections context that would likely invalidate card
signatures;2' 4 and it offers employees a narrower window in which to
challenge the effects of coercive speech or conduct that occurred during the
260- See, e.g., Terry A. Bethel & Catherine A. Melfi, Judicial Enforcement of NLRB Bargaining
Orders: What Influences the Courts?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 139, 173-75 (1988) (describing
appellate courts' lack of respect for or deference to Board decisions to impose bargaining
orders between 1979 and 1982); Brudney, supra note 154, at 985-87, 1002-05 (describing
reversal rate for forty-two bargaining orders as 38.1% in cases decided between 1986 and 1993,
significantly exceeding reversal rate for any other remedial issues during same period).
261. See, e.g., Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing
bargaining order as "not a snake-oil cure for whatever ails the workplace [but] an extreme
remedy that must be applied with commensurate care"); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904
F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990) (characterizing bargaining orders as having the "drastic
consequence of forcing union representation on employees"). See generally Brudney, supra note
154, at 1006-08.
262. SeeJames J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1563, 1587 (1996) and sources cited therein. This stunning decline of 85% in the twenty-
five years after Gissel had approved the bargaining order remedy substantially exceeded the 50%
decline in election activity over the same period. Given the 28% increase in § 8(a) (3) charges
filed between 1970 and 1990, one can hardly attribute the decrease in bargaining orders to
heightened levels of law-abiding conduct by the employer community. See id.
263. While card check recognition requires support from a majority of all employees in the
bargaining unit, the rules governing elections require union support only from a majority of all
employees who decide to cast votes. See NLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL, supra note 122, §
1t340.4(a).
264. Compare Midland Life Ins. Co. 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 130-33 (1982) (holding that
misrepresentations of law or fact by employer or union during election campaign do not violate
laboratory conditions), with Bookland, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 35, 36 (1975) (holding that
misrepresentations about the purpose or effect of signing a card may lead to card being
invalidated in unfair labor practice case).
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organizing campaign 265
One could argue that the election paradigm was flawed as a theoretical
matter from its inception, in that employer-union competition differs
266fundamentally from the electoral contest between political candidates. An
employer has the authority to set wages and benefits, assign tasks, monitor
performance, and impose discipline-all on a daily basis. This power to
create and convey a dependent relationship inevitably invigorates an
employer's persuasive campaign statements.267 By contrast, the union-even
if it prevails on election day-holds neither economic nor legal power over
its potential constituency of workers, and its relationship to unrepresented
employees must therefore be a relatively contingent one. Unlike political
elections, a union election is not a precursor to assuming powers of
governance; it is simply a precursor to initiating a collective bargaining
265process.
Perhaps the election paradigm was more accurate, and even more
normatively satisfying, in the era following World War II, when employers
acceded more readily to the possibility of becoming unionized, and
analogies between industrial and political democracy reflected in part a
269
shared societal impulse to celebrate recent national triumphs. Yet,
assuming arguendo that the guidelines and restrictions imposed on
employers and unions under the election paradigm were at one point
defensible in principle, the serious and pervasive practical difficulties of the
past thirty years have rendered the paradigm inapplicable. The law
regulating union election campaigns has developed since 1970 to exacerbate
many of the inherent inequalities between labor and management in this
265. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 101.19(b) (2000) (providing that election results will be certified
within seven days after ballots are tallied unless union or employer objects to conduct of the
election; employee's unfair labor practice charge does not block certification), with 29 U.S.C §
160(b) (2000) (following voluntary recognition under card check, employee has six months in
which to file unfair labor practice charge that can contest and invalidate card-based majority
statls). See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 190, at 578-85.
266. See UNFAIR ADVANTAGE, supra note 242, at 18-25; Becker, supra note 4, at 569-70.
267. See Logan, supra note 244, at 201-03 (describing pervasive role of supervisors in
undermining support for unions); id. at 203-04 (describing importance of convincing
employees that their real choice is between the union and their jobs). See generally UNFAIR
ADVANTAGE, supra note 242, at 21-22, 94-98; Becker, supra note 4, at 552-69.
268. See generally Paul Weiler, Radically Moderate Law Reform 13 (2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review).
269. See generally Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor
Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKLEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 11-18 (1999)
(linking rise of pluralist political theory in post-World War II period to industrial pluralist
description of the workplace as a mini-democracy); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1525 (1981) (discussing industrial pluralism's
celebratory metaphor of modem industry as a mini-democracy); William M. Wiecek, America in
the Post-War Years: Transition and Transformation, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2000)
(discussing how new regime of industrial pluralism, along with huge postwar gains in workers'
productivity, encouraged management to accept an increasingly unionized workplace).
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setting.27° Relying heavily on hordes of "union avoidance" consultants and
advisers, employers have taken greater advantage of what the law permits or
does not sufficiently deter.2 7 ' As succinctly expressed by one eminent labor
law scholar, "[the intensity of opposition to unionization which is exhibited
by American employers has no parallel in the western industrial world."
272
3. Tenacity of the Election Paradigm
The deterioration of the election paradigm has not been enough to
trigger its rejection in favor of something new. Borrowing from Kuhn's
analysis, the relevant public policy community's consensus around this
271paradigm is an impediment to predictable change. Studies identifying
serious problems in the operation of the Board-supervised elections regime
are not new. Academic observers and government commissions have
documented multiple anomalies over the past several decades.274 Congress
sought to rectify some of the anomalies in the late 1970s, proposing
expedited union election procedures and stronger remedies for employer
misconduct during campaigns.2 15 This effort at legislative reform lacked the
necessary supermajority to survive a Senate filibuster, and the likelihood that
270. See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992) (restricting union organizer
access); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (relaxing rules against
employer misrepresentation); Weiler, supra note 251, at 1787-93 (1983) (discussing
ineffectiveness of backpay awards and reinstatement remedy); supra notes 260-62 (discussing
appellate courts' action to place severe limits on availability of bargaining orders).
271. See ICFTU REPORT FOR WTO, supra note 65, at 3 (reporting that 75% of employers
hire outside consultants and security firms to run anti-union campaigns); MARTIN JAY LEVITT,
CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER 56-58, 73-76, 90-117, 132-51, 227-58 (1993) (describing
proliferation of aggressively anti-union employer associations and individual consultants during
1970s and early 1980s); Logan, supra note 244, at 200-09 (discussing in detail the vast array of
union-avoidance tactics utilized by management and its hired aids during organizing
campaigns); see also Richard McGill Murphy, The Persuaders: Worried That Your Employees Will Join
a Union? Perhaps These Gentlemen Can Help, FORTUNE, May 22, 2004 (presenting union avoidance
techniques as a form of enhanced personnel relations), http://www.fortune.com/fortune/
smallbusiness/managing/articles/0,15114,614421,00.html (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
A leading management lawyer aptly captured the law's favorable treatment of employers in this
regard, observing that management "can do so much within the confines of the law to combat
unionism that they need not.., break the law." Logan, supra note 244, at 208.
272. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 631, 639 (1985).
273. See KUHN, supra note 1, at 77 (contending that scientific community's faith in reigning
paradigm is overcome not simply based on paradigm's failure to explain natural events or
conditions, but by simultaneous community-wide decisions to accept a new paradigm).
274. See supra notes 58-63, 242-56 (identifying tendency of elections regime to permit and
promote intimidation, coercion, and lengthy delays, all of which substantially compromise
employees' freedom of choice).
275. See H.R. REP. No. 95-637, at 5, 7 (1977) (describing key provisions of Labor Law
Reform Act of 1977, requiring that many representation elections be conducted within fifteen
days of the filing of the petition, and providing for double back pay and preliminary injunctions
when workers are illegally fired during an organizing campaign).
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Congress will revisit such a polarized issue any time soon seems remote.27
6
At one point during the 1980s, organized labor proposed abandoning
not only Board-supervised elections but the NLRA as a whole. Although
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland spoke of returning to the "law of the
[economic] jungle," his threat was viewed as largely rhetorical. 277 The steady
erosion of private sector union membership since the 1970s is attributable to
many factors in addition to outmoded aspects of federal labor law.
Deregulation, technological advances, and foreign competition have
transformed the economic realities in U.S. product and labor markets.
2
'
8
These larger forces will continue to present serious challenges to organized
labor's efforts at reversing the long-running decline in union density. Even
with new leadership's substantial commitment to invest in organizing,279 the
percentage of workers represented by unions nationally has dropped slightly
from 1998 to 2003.280
In the context of our legal paradigm, however, organized labor's shift in
practices is noteworthy and clearly beyond the rhetorical. Some three
million members have been reported as added by AFL-CIO unions since
1998. Because over 80% of this new organizing over a six year period has
occurred outside the domain of Board-supervised elections,81 the Court's
statement in Gissel, that such elections "will continue to be held in the vast
majority of cases, " 2s ' no longer reflects reality. Further, given that so many
major unions, with employer acquiescence, are relying successfully on
276. The bill gained House approval by a vote of 257-163, but garnered only fifty-eight
votes in the Senate, two short of the sixty needed to cut off debate. See 123 CONG. REC. 32,613
(1977) (passing the House); 124 CONG. REC. 17,749, 18,398-18,400 (1978) (failing to achieve
cloture, followed by withdrawal of the Senate bill). There has been no significant change in the
NLRA since 1959, despite occasional efforts at reform. See generally Brudney, supra note 262, at
t571, 1592-93.
277. See Barry Cronin, Historic Labor Act Under Increasing Fire, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 1, 1985,
at 51 (reporting that Kirkland's rhetorical call to shift worker demands from legal process back
to the streets is due in large part to frustration with the current makeup and conduct of the
NLRB); Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CO Chief Calls Labor Laws a "Dead Letter, " WALL
ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8 (quoting Kirkland's "law of the jungle" statement, adding that
Kirkland viewed repeal as simply an option, unlikely to be approved by Congress). See generally
SUBCOMM. ON LAB.-MGMT. RELATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB., 98TH CONG., THE
FAILURE OF LABOR LAw-A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS (1984).
278. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 1-27; Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law
Reform in a World ofCompetitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 6-10 (1993);Joel Rogers,
Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 97, 102-10 (1993).
279. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
280. See HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 45; News Release, supra note 45.
There has been growth in union density in certain sectors of the economy, such as health care
and the public workforce, and in certain geographic areas, notably California, which is home to
more than one of nine persons in the U.S. labor force. See Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, supra
note 45, at 39-41, 47.
281. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
282. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 607 (1969).
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neutrality plus card check, and that the approach readily survives any facial
legal challenge, there is good reason to believe that it will continue to be
pursued as a basic organizing strategy.
Whether neutrality and card check should supplant elections as a
prescriptive matter deserves further attention and discussion. B 3 For
proponents of neutrality, the very 'existence -of a contractual agreement
signifies that the employer and union have achieved some preliminary
degree of mutual respect. Employees are therefore able to perceive, prior to
being canvassed, that their employer is willing to enter into a constructive
relationship with a union in order to set procedural ground rules for
ascertaining what they, the employees, really want. That manifestation of the
employer's attitude, albeit within a narrow ambit, helps to alleviate the
employees' otherwise rational perception that their employer may have a
punitive stake in how they exercise their choice.
Opponents of neutrality often counter that if employees are unable to
hear the employer's side of the story, they will not be equipped to make a
suitably informed and reasoned choice. That contention, however, invites
doubt on two separate grounds. One is that the employer already has both
the opportunity and motive to present reasons in favor of an individual
bargaining regime before the union ever makes an appearance and is likely
to have done so over a period of months if not years. A second is that the
optimal time for informed choice about the merits of a particular union's
ongoing presence will occur' during contract negotiations-when employees
must focus on precisely what a collectively bargained workplace would look
like.284
Apart from their informational concerns, supporters of secret ballot
voting worry that too many individuals will sign cards without giving the
matter enough thought, or from fear of being criticized by their fellow
employees. It is not at all clear that workers will succumb so readily to
indifference or socially generated peer pressure.2 15 Assuming they do,
however, a union seems unlikely to retain employees' allegiance while
negotiating a contract with their employer unless it can persuade them that
its bargaining priorities and demands deserve majority support and even a
commitment to apply group pressure if warranted.
In principle, it is widely acknowledged that election campaigns of some
duration tend to promote information-sharing, reasoned debate, and
fairness in decisionmaking. Such advantages, however, presuppose an
283. See generlly supra Part ILA (summarizing terms of the public policy and political
debate in Congress).
284. See Weiler, supra note 251, at 1815-16 (discussing arguments in favor of an extended
election campaign to assure that employees opposing unionization can be adequately defended
and supported in informational terms).
285. Any pressure more direct or overt than what is socially generated is already prohibited
by law. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
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idealized version of the elections process. The past several decades of NLRA
elections experience has undermined this ideal by establishing that
employer coercion, in all its subtlety and magnitude, inevitably exerts
enormous influence during the traditional six or seven week Board-
supervised campaign.
Accordingly, it seems worth asking in normative terms whether the
potential risks for employee choice from a broadly implemented neutrality
and card check approach may on balance be less than the risks that have
been amply demonstrated with respect to the Board-supervised elections
regime. Defenders of the election paradigm presumably will continue to
invoke its virtues-idealized or otherwise-to justify its traditional priority
status. At the same time, an increasing number of participants and observers
whose faith has been disrupted by the paradigm's "severe and prolonged
anomalies" must decide if there is "an alternate candidate [that] is available
,,2116to take its place.
In this setting, neutrality plus card check has emerged as a serious
option. By displacing the central role of Board-supervised elections while
remaining committed to the Act's underlying goal of protecting employee
freedom of choice, the neutrality/card check approach challenges the
explanatory and prescriptive force of the election paradigm. This new
approach has become in effect a counterpoint to the decades of sharp-edged
employer practices (both lawful and unlawful) that have undermined the
descriptive and normative persuasiveness of the election paradigm. The
proliferation of neutrality plus card check arrangements thus presents the
question of whether the election paradigm should be modified, or even
abandoned.
C. FRTURE PROSPECTS
This Article is meant to initiate a more open conversation about the
need to re-think our dominant conceptual framework; it is not the place to
formulate detailed options for alternatives to the election paradigm. I do
want to suggest, however, that several plausible models exist, drawn from
comparable legal cultures in which the promotion of collective bargaining is
integrated with the recognized importance of protecting employee choice. It
may not be necessary or even advisable to embrace a single option; given our
federal structure and a tradition of encouraging voluntary agreements that
promote stable workplace relations, several alternatives may coexist as part
of a revised conceptual approach.
One possibility is to follow the Canadian law model, prescribing card
check certification as a basic method for establishing collective bargaining
rights. Under the Canadian national labour code, as well as four Canadian
286. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting Kuhn on prospects for changing
paradigms).
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provincial labour codes, a union will be certified by the relevant labour
board if a majority of employees in the unit (for two provinces, a
supermajority) have signed cards authorizing the union to represent
them.2" The willingness to defer to card majorities as a reflection of
employee free choice does include certain safeguards. Provincial labour
boards typically investigate surrounding circumstances to assure the absence
of direct or tacit management support, or of union fraud or intimidation.
2 s8
In addition, statutes require card signers to complete a membership
application and make a nominal monetary payment to the union to confirm
the voluntary nature of their decision.289 Further, some provincial boards will
order an election when the card signers represent a relatively narrow
majority of the employees in a unit, or conditions otherwise suggest a closely
contested outcome.
0
Still, the presumption under these Canadian statutes is that signed
authorization cards are a legitimate and indeed preferred means of
ascertaining the will of the majority, with the secret ballot vote used "as a
reserve instrument rather than as a frontline weapon." 291 This approach to
certification of bargaining representatives reverses the priorities formally
established under current NLRA law. 
2
287. See R.S.C., c. L-2, § 30-3 (1985) (Can.) (Canada Labour Code, applicable only to
industries of national concern such as transportation and communications industries, and
banks); R.S.Q., c. C-27, § 21 (1977) (Que.) (Quebec Labour Code); R.S.B.C., c. 244, § 23
(1996) (B.C.) (British Columbia Labour Relations Code-requires 55% of bargaining unit
members for certification); R.S.N.B, c. 1-4, § 14(2)-(5) (1973) (N.B.) (New Brunswick
Industrial Relations Act-requires 60% of bargaining unit members for certification);
R.S.P.E.I., c. Li-, § 12(4) (1998) (P.E.I.) (Prince Edward Island Labour Act); see also DOUGLAS
G. GILBERT ET AL., CANADIAN LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE U.S. PRACTITIONER 13,
32-33, 44-46, 400-03 (2003).
288. See Plateau Mills, Ltd. & Int'l Woodworkers, Local 1-424, 1 CAN. LAB. REL. BD. REP.
(Butterworth) 82, 88-89 (1977) (discussing Board monitoring to protect against unions' use of
fraud or intimidation to secure signatures); GILBERT ET AL., supra note 287, at 45 (discussing
labour boards' rigorous monitoring to guard against improper management support).
289. See Sheila Murphy, Comment, A Comparison of the Selection of Bargaining Representatives in
the United States and Canada: Linden Lumber, Gissel, and the Right to Challenge Majority Status, 10
CoMp. LAB. LJ. 65, 82-84 (1988) (discussing initiation fee and membership application);
Weiler, supra note 251, at 1809 & n.146 (same).
290. See R.S.B.C., c. 244, § 23 (stating that secret ballot election is required if authorization
cards filed by union reflect more than 45% but less than 55% of all unit members); Plateau
Mills, 1 CAN. LAB. REL. BD. REP. (Butterworth) at 89 (noting that provincial board may order
election in circumstances where narrow majority of card signers exists and minority of
employees actively opposes union); see also Fabricland Pac. Ltd. v. I.L.G.W.U. Local 287, 1999
WL 33461541, at *3 (B.C.L.R.B. 1999) (noting need to exercise special caution in relying on
membership cards as evidence, and stating that Board "must insist on a high degree of integrity
and precision in the cards presented to it" as membership evidence).
291. Weiler, supra note 251, at 1809 n.146.
292. Certification based on card majorities was available in the early years of the Wagner
Act, but after 1939 the NLRB formally shifted to elections as the preferred means of
determining employee choice. See Weiler, supra note 251, at 1806 n.137 and sources cited
HeinOnline  -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 878 2004-2005
NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS & CARD CHECK RECOGNITION 879
A second option-also borrowed from Canadian law-is to retain
elections as the primary employee choice mechanism while compressing the
campaign period so as to minimize the possibility of employer intimidation
or coercion. Four provincial labour codes require the labour board to hold
an election within five to seven days of receiving a certification petition
supported by a card majority.21 The assumption behind such an "instant
ballot" approach is that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for employers
to play the same role as the union does in a representation campaign.M
The instant ballot approach, although presumably less attractive to card
check proponents, is similar in important respects to what now occurs under
a neutrality agreement. Employers agreeing to neutrality voluntarily limit
their power to oppose. Employers in an instant ballot setting are limited by
law as to the time for-and therefore extent of-expressing their
opposition.25 ' Under either approach, employees considering arguments in
favor of or opposed to unionization must decide-in the face of their own
employer's muted stance-if the terms and conditions that exist under the
• 296
current individual-bargaining regime are worthy of continued support.
Whether through card check recognition or expedited election, the
Canadian legal system has accepted the principle of limiting employer
opportunities to campaign against unionization as consistent with the goal
of effectuating meaningful employee free choice. Win rates for unions that
seek to organize under these two approaches are broadly comparable to
therein.
293. See R.S.O., c. 1, § 8 (1995) (Ont.) (Ontario Labour Relations Act; election within five
days); Manitoba Labor Relations Act § 48(1) (election within seven days); R.S.N., c. L-, § 47
(1990) (Nfld.) (Newfoundland Labour Relations; election within five days); R.S.N.S., c. 475, §
25(3) (1989) (N.S.) (Nova Scotia Trade Union Act; election usually within five days).
294. See GILBERT ET AL., supra note 287, at 47-48 (reporting that short time frame reflects
legislatures' intent to minimize employer's opportunity to mount a countercampaign); see also
Weiler, supra note 251, at 1812-14 (analogizing employer's role in a representation election to
role played by an interested foreign government in a U.S. political election).
295. At least one U.S. union has pursued a comparable approach by contracting for
neutrality-type standards to govern an election campaign. The SEIU often negotiates private
election procedure agreements, providing for "consent elections" administered by the NLRB
but accompanied by special codes of employer and union campaign conduct, codes enforced
through prompt and binding private arbitration. See Judith A. Scott, Workers' Rights to
Organize as Human Rights: The California Experience, Speech to the Los Angeles County Bar
10-11 (Feb. 26, 2004) (transcript on file with the Iowa Law Review).
Supporters of the current election paradigm will likely regard expedited election laws
as too rigid or formalistic, even if the five-day period were to be somewhat extended. Congress
considered a version of the instant ballot approach in its debate over labor law reform in 1977
and 1978. The original bill would have required an election within fifteen days of the petition
being filed. This was extended in successive modifications to thirty-five days until the bill itself
failed to muster the necessary sixty Senate votes. See Weiler, supra note 251, at 1812 (identifying
successive versions of House bill).
296. See generally Weiler, supra note 251, at 1815-16 (considering and rejecting argument
that instant ballot unfairly deprives employees of access to valuable information as to reasons
for voting against union).
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successes reported for U.S. organizing campaigns involving neutrality and
card check. Canadian unions have remained reasonably strong during the
past several decades, registering fairly steady levels of union membership at a
time when union membership in the United States has precipitously
declined.29 8 Further, in contrast to the considerable evidence that the NLRB
elections framework does not promote genuine freedom of choice, there is
little evidence that the Canadian options described here have undermined
employees' ability to express their true preferences. 29
297. See, e.g., Chris Riddell, Union Suppression and Certification Success, 34 CAN. J. ECON. 396,
400-01 (2001) (reporting that in British Columbia, unions organizing private sector employers
had 73% average success rate when operating under province's expedited ten day election
statute from 1984 to 1992, and 92% average success rate when operating under province's card
check recognition statute from 1979 to 1984 and from 1993 to 1998); Weiler, supra note 251, at
1812 n.153 (reporting that in Nova Scotia, unions had 80% win rate in instant elections during
early 1980s). Success rates under either approach are comparable to the 78% rate reported by
Eaton & Kriesky for campaigns involving neutrality and card check, see supra note 53 and
accompanying text, and they well exceed the 40% success rate for NLRB elections involving
units of 100 or more employees. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
298. See GILBERT ET AL., supra note 287, at 27 (stating that Canadian unions as of 2001
continued to represent about 32% of nonagricultural workforce, compared to 14% in the
United States; recent successful campaigns at Wal-Mart and McDonald's highlight differences);
US.-Based Unions Lost Ground in Canada from 1977 to 2003, Neu Study Determines, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at A10-11 (Sept. 1, 2004) (reporting 43% growth in Canadian union membership from
1977 to 2003, roughly parallel to increases in Canadian employment levels; unionization was at
32.6% in 1977 and is at 30.5% as of June 2004). Support for unions in Canada also has kept
pace with substantial changes in the nature of the workforce. See, e.g., id. (reporting that 48% of
Canadian union members were female in 2003, compared with 12% in 1977; proportion of
women in workforce belonging to unions is now equal to proportion of men).
299. Canadian and provincial labour boards monitor use of both card check recognition
and expedited elections, and they have imposed penalties for the serious misuse or exploitation
that has occasionally occurred. See R.C. Purdy Chocolates Ltd. & C.E.P., Local 2000, 77
C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 1, 21 (Can. Lab. Bd. 2002) (noting that certification of union was obtained with
forged cards, and emphasizing this was only such known instance since Labour Code provision
was enacted twenty-eight years earlier; Board cancels union's certification); Fabricland Pacific
Ltd. v. I.L.G.W.U., Local 287, 1999 WL 33461541, at *4-5 (B.C.L.R.B. 1999) (reporting that
provincial labour board cancelled union certification because an employee signed the card of
fellow employee who was away on vacation; Board stressed need to preserve integrity of card-
based system).
Riddell's studies do indicate that unions in British Columbia are less successful under
a mandatory election procedure (even an expedited procedure) than under card check, See
Riddell, supra note 297; Chris Riddell, Union Certification Success Under Voting Versus Card-Check
Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia, 1978-1988, 57 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 497 (2004)
[hereinafter Riddell II]; see also Susan Johnson, Card Check or Mandatory Representation Vote? How
the Type of Union Recognition Procedure Affects Union Certification Success, 12 ECON. J. 344, 344
(2002) (studying union recognition procedures in nine Canadian provinces from 1978 to 1996,
and reporting that mandatory votes reduce certification success rates by about 9% below rates
for card check). Notwithstanding the enforced brevity of the campaign, some employers
apparently appreciate the value of using unlawful coercion or pressure to reduce the chances
for union success. See Riddell II, supra, at 498, 509 (concluding that management opposition,
measured by number of unfair labor practices, had substantial adverse impact on union support
in expedited elections). Nonetheless, employer unfair labor practice activity in Canadian
[20051
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A third alternative involves borrowing from recently revised British
labour law. Until 1999, union recognition in the U.K. was part of a purely
voluntary regime: unions that had sufficient support would either persuade
an employer that it was in his best interest to recognize and bargain with the
union, or strike for such recognition 00° The Employment Relations Act of
1999 comprehensively reformed this traditional voluntarist approach,
providing for a statutory recognition procedure. Although loosely
patterned after the NLRA, the British statute effectively provides for non-
electoral recognition as the primary option, with elections as a fallback; in
this respect it also bears some resemblance to the Canadian card check
recognition model.
When a union formally requests recognition, and the employer does
302
not accede voluntarily within thirty days, the new British statute provides
for two possible pathways. The union will first apply to the Central
Arbitration Committee ("CAC"), a governmental entity charged with
determining whether there is in fact majority support for an appropriately
identified unit.3°3 If the CAC is satisfied that the union enjoys majority status,
it is authorized to declare the union as recognized without an election.0 4 As
with the Canadian model, there are exceptions. The CAC must hold an
election, even where a majority of unit employees are union members, in
three situations: (i) when an election is in the interest of good industrial
relations; (ii) when a significant number of workers inform the CAC that
they do not want the union; and (iii) when "evidence" regarding the
circumstances in which union members became members creates sufficient
expedited campaigns is far less frequent than what occurs during the NLRB's protracted
election campaigns. See, e.g., Riddell, supra note 297, at 401 (comparing studies of NLRB
elections to British Columbia experience); Terry Thomason, The Effect of Accelerated Certiflcation
Procedures on Union Organizing Success in Ontario, 47 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 207, 224-25 (1994)
(comparing study of NLRB elections to Ontario experience in 1980s). It is therefore not
surprising that union organizing success under Canada's expedited elections procedures is
greater than under the NLRB elections framework. See Joseph B. Rose & Gary N. Chaison,
Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21st Century: The Prospects for Revival, 56 RELAI'loNS
INDUSTRIEILES/INDUST. REL. 34, 36 (2001) (observing that substantially higher levels of
organizing activity and organizing success rates in Canada are "to a considerable extent...
associated with differences in the legal environment").
300. See Jared S. Gross, Recognition of Labor Unions in a Comparative Context: Has the United
Kingdom Entered a New Era?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 357, 360 (2003); Nicholas Robertson,
Conpulsory Trade Union Recognition: New Rights for Trade Union, 10 INT'L CO. & COMM. L. REV.
303, 303 (1999).
301, Employment Relations Act, 1999, c. 26 (inserting Parts I and II of Schedule Al to the
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992); see Gross, supra note 300, at
369-78; Robertson, supra note 300, at 304-07; Bob Simpson, Trade Union Recognition and the
Law-A New Approach, 29 INDUS. L.J. 193, 194-212 (2000).
302. See Gross, supra note 300, at 374; Simpson, supra note 301, at 199.
303. See Hazel Oliver, Trade Union Recognition: "Fairness at Work"?, 20 COMP. IAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 33, 35 (1998); Simpson, supra note 301, at 201-02.
304. See Robertson, supra note 300, at 306-07; Simpson, supra note 301, at 208.
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doubts about whether a significant number of workers really want the union
to bargain for them.0 5
These rather broadly worded exceptions, limiting the CAC's authority
to recognize unions without an election, may in the long term invite
employers to seek a larger number of elections. 30 6 On the other hand, the
British statutory scheme includes certain provisions that arguably create
incentives for employers to explore voluntary recognition. An employer that
resists a union request for recognition accompanied by strong membership
support, and instead opts for a CAG-supervised election, must grant the
union reasonable access to its employees during the campaign.3 0 7 In
addition, if the union prevails, the CAC is authorized to impose a procedure
setting forth detailed standards for conducting collective bargaining
negotiations."
Initial returns under the new law indicate -hat employers are inclined to
sign voluntary agreements and avoid the CAC process entirely if there is
majority support for the union. Over 90% of U.K recognition arrangements
established between 2000 and 2003 resulted from voluntary agreement
between the employer and union, with no government supervision.39 One
British commentator, noting employers' frequently neutral or receptive
attitudes when confronted with well-supported claims for recognition, has
suggested that these employers perceive a range of business advantages for
unions in helping to promote stable industrial relations, advantages that
include enhanced employee productivity, leverage in securing public sector
contracts, and assistance in dealing with the growing complexity of a
regulated environment.3 l0 Such business-related benefits are strikingly
similar to the advantages cited by U.S. employers when they enter into
305. See Gross, supra note 300, at 376; Simpson, supra note 301, at 209.
306. See Simpson, supra note 301, at 208-09 (suggesting this possibility, and noting
especially that employer insistence on an election could be viewed as justifying the holding of
one "in the interest of good industrial relations").
307. See id. at 210-11 (discussing implications of this union access requirement).
308. See generally Oliver, supra note 303, at 35-36; Nancy Peters, The United Kingdom
Recalibrates the U.S. National Labor Relations Act: Possible Lessons for the U.S. , 25 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'YJ. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 19, on file with the Iowa Law Review).
309. See Peters, supra note 308, at 11-12 (reporting, based on Trades Union Congress
("TUC") data, that from November 2000 to October 2002, 732 of 776 recognition agreements
were voluntary between unions and management; only forty-four were imposed by CAC); Sonia
McKay & Sian Moore, Union Recognition Agreements in the Shadow of the Law, 33 INDUS. L. J. 374
(2004) (reporting, based on TUC data, that while new Act has produced fewer than 100
statutory awards of recognition, more than 1,200 voluntary recognition agreements have been
reached since 1998); see also Gregor Gall, Trade Union Recognition in Britain, 1995-2002: Turning
a Corner?, 35 INDUS. REL. J. 249, 251, 254, 268 (2004) (reporting substantial increases in
voluntary recognition agreements since 1999, and attributing increases to 1999 Act's "shadow
effect" in fostering new industrial relations climate).
310. See Gall, supra note 309, at 255-56.
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neutrality plus card check arrangements.3 '
Each of the options summarized here stems at least in part from
legislators' periodic willingness to rethink their basic approach when
promoting and protecting workers' ability to choose whether to support a
union. In the United States, however, such rethinking would require
substantial movement from Congress, an unlikely development.312 The
myriad factors that have made so many U.S. employers fiercely resistant to
unions will continue to fuel strong opposition to any legislative reforms that
would tend to facilitate unionization. While the election paradigm no longer
reflects descriptive reality, it remains useful, in strategic and rhetorical
terms, to explain and justify the status quo.
Absent any prospect of imminent change in the statutory framework, it
falls to the interested community of non-legislative actors-including Board
personnel, union-side and management-side experts, and labor relations
academics and commentators-to address the shift that is occurring within
existing legal boundaries. A growing number of employers have concluded,
in light of modem competitive realities, that neutrality-based contractual
arrangements with independent unions interested in representing their
workforce will operate to their economic advantage. These contractual
understandings have not wholly supplanted Board-supervised elections, nor
are they likely to do so. Yet, when properly structured-with safeguards to
ensure that cards are signed voluntarily and a neutral reviewer to verify the
achievement of majority support 1 ---they may well grow into the primary
option exercised by employees and unions under our federal labor law
framework.
There are ample policy-related reasons to encourage such growth. As
demonstrated earlier, neutrality plus card check poses no serious doctrinal
challenge to employee freedom of choice. From a practical standpoint,
neutrality agreements would seem to promote employee free choice at least
as effectively as the faltering elections-based regime-by minimizing the
obstacles posed by lengthy election-related delays and by reducing the
corrosive impact of lawful and unlawful employer pressure.
311. See supra Part LC (discussing U.S. employers'motivations).
312. As noted earlier, Democrats in the House and Senate have taken some initiative in this
regard by introducing bills that would require the Board to develop procedures for certifying
unions with card majorities. See H.R. 3619, 108th Cong. (2003), and S. 1925, 108th Cong.
(2003), discussed supra note 110 and accompanying text; 149 GONG. REC. E2421 (daily ed. Nov.
22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Miller); 149 CONG. REc. S. 15805 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). In the current highly polarized congressional climate, neither the
Norwood bill introduced in 2004 (banning card check altogether) nor the Kennedy-Miller
proposals introduced in 2003 have much prospect of being enacted into law.
313. See UNFAIR ADVANTAGE, supra note 242, at 88-89 (identifying employee free choice
protections available in a card check setting); Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 47-48
(discussing limitations on union behavior and inclusion of arbitration provision as common
features of neutrality agreements studied by authors).
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Neutrality plus card check also advances two distinct values that are
fundamental to our national labor laws. By transforming union organizing
campaigns from bitter and divisive contests into relatively civil and "positive"
exchanges, neutrality and card check arrangements encourage more stable
and peaceful labor relations. This promotion of industrial peace-the
"overriding policy of the NLRA" 14 -relates in important respects to the fact
that neutrality agreements typically set limits on unions as well as
employers. 315 In addition, neutrality plus card check celebrates voluntary
and separately negotiated solutions to labor management disputes. Such
voluntary contractual arrangements have long been a favored element of
national labor policy.
316
CONCLUSION
The development of neutrality and card check as a competing
paradigm indicates its emerging importance in structuring the organizing
process. A series of challenges or puzzles are being explored by the Board
and the federal courts,317 as unions and employers probe the opportunities
and risks that accompany the new approach. This puzzle-solving activity has
increased substantially in the past five years, and there is good reason to
expect such growth to continue. Assuming that Congress neither ratifies nor
disapproves the non-electoral alternative framework, it seems likely that both
Board-supervised elections and neutrality plus card check will coexist as
potentially preeminent descriptive and normative accounts of the employee
self-determination process.
Further discussion regarding these competing paradigms will take place
against a backdrop of growing economic uneasiness. The sharply diminished
role played by unions in the U.S. economy since the 1960s has been
accompanied by a substantial growth of inequality in our labor market.
314. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 38 (1987) (citing Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96,103 (1954)).
315. See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 27, at 48.
316. See, e.g., NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952); NLRB v. Broadmoor
Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1978); MGM Grand Hotel Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464, 469
(1999); Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388, 389 (1975).
317. See, e.g., Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res.,
390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004) (addressing whether state or local laws encouraging or requiring
neutrality are preempted by the NLRA); United States Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 364
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Hotel & Rest. Employee Union, Local 217 v. J. P. Morgan
Hotel, 996 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1993) (addressing challenges to enforceability of neutrality
agreements under § 301 of LMRA); Pall Biomedical Prods. Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 1674 (2000),
enforcement denied, 273 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (addressing whether neutrality agreements are
a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining); New Otani Hotel & Garden, 331 N.L.R.B.
1078 (2000) (addressing whether unions' request for neutrality and card check constitutes a
demand for recognition that would give employer the right to insist on a Board election); see
also Rosenfeld's Report, supra note 217, at E-1 to E-8 (discussing recently decided and still pending
Board cases that address the lawfulness of neutrality agreements in varying circumstances).
[20051
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Earnings for non-supervisory employees have been largely stagnant for the
past three decades,"" employees work longer hours as their vacation and
holiday time has declined,1 9 the gap between workers in the upper and
lower tiers has widened, 20 and the divide between salaries for top CEOs and
average workers has become simply breathtaking.321
The possibility of a shift in paradigms does not signify that overall union
density will increase. Despite polls showing a heightened interest in joining
322
unions among employees from across the economy, there has been no
318. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 19 (discussing stagnation of real
earnings as of early 1990s); FREEMAN & ROGERS, supranote 256, at 13 & n.16 (discussing various
studies on stagnation of earnings); THOMAS I. PALLEY, PLENTY OF NOTHING: THE DOWNSIZING
OF THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE CASE FOR STRUCTURAL KEYNESIANISM 52, 57 (1998)
(discussing the decline in average compensation for non-supervisory workers from 1970 to
1995); Weiler, supra note 268, at 4 (reporting less than 10% increase in real median hourly
earnings from 1973 to 2003, as contrasted with over 100% increase from 1943 to 1973). Full-
time workers near the bottom of the U.S. labor market are noticeably worse off then their peers
in the European Union or Japan. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra, note 256, at 13; DUNLOP
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 28.
319. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 19 (reporting modest decline in length
of vacation and holiday time for fully employed U.S. workers from early 1970s to early 1990s;
U.S. workers averaged 200 more hours of work per year than workers in Europe, with amount
of vacation time a major reason for difference);JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN:
THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 1, 32-24 (1991) (discussing substantial increase in
working hours from 1970 to 1990 and notable decline in vacation and holiday time during
1980s); Weiler, supra note 268, at 5 (reporting that in 2002, the average individual U.S. worker
put in 1994 hours, compared to 1803 for Japanese worker, 1693 for British, and 1557 for
German; key reason for differential is decline in American vacation time while acation and
holiday time has risen in other countries).
320. See DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 36, at 19 (reporting that male workers in top
decile earn 2.14 times median earnings in United States compared to 1.4 to 1.7 times the
median in most European countries, and that U.S. earnings distribution among workers has
widened greatly in recent years); FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 256, at 13 (reporting that top
10% of U.S. workers earn 5.6 times as much as bottom 10%, compared with differentials of 2.1
times in European Union and 2.4 times in Japan).
321. See PALLEY, supra note 318, at 57-58 (reporting that in 1960, average CEO pay was
forty-one times average factory worker pay; by 1996, average CEO was paid 212 times what
average factory worker earned); Weiler, supra note 268, at 6 (reporting that in 1973, total pay
for the top 100 CEOs averaged 217 times the average worker salary; by 2000, earnings for the
top 100 CEOs were 1,284 times the average worker salary).
322. See Upfront, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 16, 2002, at 6 (reporting that for first time in twenty
years, more nonunion employees (50%) say they would vote to form a union than those saying
they would not (43%)); see also David Moberg, Do or Die, IN THESE TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001, at 12
(reporting that 41% of public views unions positively, while 24% hold negative views; this
compares to 35% to 34% margin in 1993). This heightened interest in unions is not surprising,
given the data indicating that unions have a substantial impact on compensation and working
conditions for those they represent. See, e.g, LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHEW WALTERS, ECON.
POL'Y INST., HOW UNIONS HELP ALL WORKERS 1 (2003) (reporting that unions raise wages of
unionized workers by roughly 20%, and that unionized workers are much more likely than their
counterparts to have paid vacation and holiday leave, employer-provided health insurance, and
employer-provided pension plans), http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/143/bp143.pdf (on
file with the Iowa Law Review).
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real growth in unionization during recent times.123 Absence of growth may
be attributed to many factors-weaknesses of the legal regime, but also lack
of sufficient energy or imagination within organized labor, and broader
economic pressures and conditions. Over the past decade, however,
organizing activity has become noticeably more intense, and the success of
neutrality plus card check has begun to shift the tenor of the conversation.
That shift may help. to initiate a franker discussion of how to improve terms
and conditions of employment for millions of workers in a society
characterized by ever-increasing disparities in wealth.
323. See HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 45, at 414 tbl.10-2 (reporting that
percentage of workforce represented by unions was between 15.6% and 14.6% from 1997 to
2002).
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